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HISTORY   •  )  IMU- 

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UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS  STUDIES 

IN  THE 
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VOL.  VIII  Jr-NB,  1919  No.  2 


THE  HISTORY  OF  CUMULATIVE  VOTING 

AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION 

IN  ILLINOIS-,   1870-1919 


BY 

BLAINE  P.  MOORE,  PH.D. 

Associate  Professor  of  Political  Science 
University  of  Kansas 


REVISED  EDITION 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 
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PUBLISHED  BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 

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COPYRIGHT,  1920 
BY  THE  UNIVERSITY  OP  ILLINOIS 


The  History  of  Cumulative  Voting 

and  Minority  Representation 

in  Illinois,  1870-1919 

BY 

ELAINE  F.  MOORE,  PH.D. 

Associate  Professor  of  Political  Science 
University  of  Kansas 


REVISED  EDITION 


PREFACE  TO  THE  REVISED  EDITION. 

The  principal  object  of  this  revision  has  been  to  bring  the 
statistical  tables  and  current  information  up  to  date,  with  such 
changes  and  additions  to  the  text  as  the  modified  tables  and  the 
passing  of  events  since  the  original  publication  have  made  neces- 
sary or  advisable.  The  enactment  of  a  valid  primary  law  by 
the  State  of  Illinois  in  1910  has  presented  a  new  question  and 
a  chapter  has  been  included  discussing  the  effect  of  the  primary 
system  as  disclosed  by  its  use  over  a  period  of  five  biennial  elec- 
tions. 

The  author  is  indebted  to  his  colleague,  Mr.  Herman  B. 
Chubb,  who  rendered  material  assistance  in  the  revision.  Dr. 
"W.  F.  Dodd  has  read  the  manuscript  and  made  important  sug- 
gestions, particularly  regarding  present  local  conditions  in  Illi- 
nois. The  author  is  also  under  obligations  to  Miss  Katherine 
Summy  for  assistance  in  proof  reading. 

B.  F.  M. 


CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION  BY  J.  W.  GARNER  .        .        .        .        .        .        ..9 

CHAPTER  I 
NEW  METHODS  OF  REPRESENTATION      . 13 

CHAPTER  II 
ADOPTION  OF  THE  CUMULATIVE  SYSTEM  IN  ILLINOIS  ....        24 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  DEGREE  OF  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION  SECURED  BY  THE  CUMULA- 
TIVE SYSTEM .        .        ....        28 

CHAPTER  IV 
PRIMARY  LEGISLATION  AND  ITS  EFFECT        .        .        .        i        .        .        43 

CHAPTER  V 

EFFECT  ON  PARTY  ORGANIZATION  .        .        .        .  '      .        .        .        .        55 

CHAPTER  VI 
PRACTICAL  DIFFICULTIES  OF  THE  CUMULATIVE  SYSTEM  AND  ITS  EFFECT 

ON  THE  LEGISLATIVE  PERSONNEL  .        .        .        .        .        .        .        63 

CHAPTER  VII 
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  .  ....        68 


INTBODUCTION 

BY  JAMES  "W.  GARNER 

Professor  of  Political  Science 
in  the  University  of  Illinois 

In  the  view  of  the  early  meeting  of  a  Constitutional  Conven- 
tion in  Illinois  and  the  certainty  that  the  question  whether 
the  existing  scheme  of  minority  representation  shall  be  retained 
will  be  the  subject  of  much  discussion  in  the  Convention,  the 
publication  of  a  revised  and  up-to-date  edition  of  Professor 
Moore's  useful  and  impartial  study  of  the  actual  working  of 
the  cumulative  system  from  1872  to  1919  is  most  timely.  He 
sets  forth  the  reasons  which  led  the  Convention  of  1870  to  estab- 
lish a  system  which  departed  from  the  practice  of  the  rest  of 
the  oountry  and  has  not  yet  found  favor  in  any  other 
state,  examines  the  somewhat  extravagant  claims  that  were 
put  forth  in  support  of  it  by  its  advocates,  and  details  the  actual 
operation  of  the  scheme,  in  an  effort  to  show  to  what  extent  if 
any  the  advantages  claimed  for  it  have  been  realized  in  prac- 
tice. The  results  show  that  with  a  few  exceptions  the  principal 
minority  party  in  each  of  the  legislative  districts  has  been  able 
to  elect  at  least  one  of  the  three  members  of  the  house  of  rep- 
resentatives to  which  the  district  is  entitled,  there  having  been 
only  six  instances  since  1872  in  which  one  party  succeeded  in 
electing  all  three  members.  The  system  has  therefore  resulted 
in  practice  in  enabling  the  chief  minority  party  in  the  state  to 
elect  more  than  one-third  of  the  members  of  the  house  of  rep- 
resentatives. But  as  the  author  points  out  the  system  does  not 
necessarily  insure  proportional  representation;  its  advocates  in 
fact  did  not  claim  that  it  would  have  this  result.  Nevertheless, 
so  far  as  the  two  dominant  parties  are  concerned,  it  has  in  prac- 
tice resulted  in  what  amounts  to  a  system  of  proportional  rep- 
resentation approximating  mathematical  exactness.  Since  the 
senate  is  not  elected  according  to  the  cumulative  system  and 
since  50  per  cent  of  its  members  are  always  ''holdovers"  it  may 

9 


10  INTRODUCTION  [152 

and  not  infrequently  does  fall  short  of  representing  the  pre- 
vailing political  sentiment  of  the  state  at  a  given  time.  Thus 
in  1904-06  the  principal  minority  party  was  represented  in  the 
senate  by  less  than  half  the  number  of  members  it  was  entitled 
to  on  the  basis  of  its  vote  at  the  last  election. 

Mr.  Moore  also  points  out  that  the  scheme  does  not  insure 
proportional  representation  to  minor  political  parties:  the 
Socialists,  Progressives,  Prohibitionists  and  others.  In  fact, 
however,  third  parties  have  been  represented  in  every  legisla- 
ture since  1872,  with  six  exceptions,  though  it  has  rarely  been 
in  proportion  to  their  voting  strength. 

While,  as  stated  above,  the  principal  minority  party  in  each 
district  has,  with  six  exceptions  since  1872,  always  succeeded  in 
electing  at  least  one  of  the  three  representatives,  it  has  also  hap- 
pened in  47  instances  that  it  elected  two  of  the  three.  In  1912 
this  occurred  in  eleven  districts.  Such  slips  of  the  cog  may  be 
due  as  the  author  shows  to  the  over-conservatism  of  the  majori- 
ty party  or  to  inaccurate  estimation  of  its  voting  strength  which 
causes  it  to  nominate  but  one  candidate ;  it  may  also  result  from 
over  estimation  of  its  voting  strength  which  leads  it  to  nominate 
three  candidates.  This  usually  results  in  the  division  of  its 
vote  to  the  advantage  of  the  minority  party  if  the  latter  puts 
only  two  candidates  in  the  field.  Finally,  and  this  is  the  most 
common,  it  may  result  from  excessive  cumulating  or  "plump- 
ing" of  votes  on  a  popular  candidate  to  the  detriment  of  his 
party  running  mate,  or  from  the  "knifing"  of  a  nominee  from 
another  county  in  favor  of  the  home  man. 

Since  the  publication  of  the  first  edition  of  Professor  Moore's 
study  the  primary  law  has  been  enacted  and  he  very  properly 
adds  a  chapter  to  the  new  edition,  showing  how  the  working  of 
the  cumulative  system  has  been  affected  by  the  law.  This  law 
empowers  the  senatorial  committee  in  each  district  to  determine 
the  number  of  candidates  that  shall  be  nominated  by  the  party 
which  it  represents  whereas  formerly  the  number  was  deter- 
mined by  the  party  managers.  Prior  to  the  enactment  of  the 
primary  law  a  standing  complaint  of  reform  organizations  such 
as  the  Legislative  Voters'  League  was  that  the  majority  party  in 
each  district  rarely  nominated  more  than  two  candidates  and 
the  minority  not  more  than  one.  As  no  more  candidates  were 
nominated  than  there  were  representatives  to  be  chosen  the 


153]  INTRODUCTION  11 

voter  had  little  choice  at  the  election.  Since  the  enactment  of 
the  primary  law  there  has  been  some  increase  in  the  number  of 
candidates  nominated  (42  per  cent  of  the  Cook  County  districts 
have  nominated  four  or  more  candidates;  in  1918,  17  districts 
outside  of  Cook  County  did  this)  but  the  proportion  is  still  com- 
paratively low  so  that  in  the  majority  of  districts  the  voters 
still  have  no  choice  at  the  general  election.  This  is  regrettable, 
but  as  Professor  Moore  points  out,  where  a  party  nominates  more 
candidates  than  it  can  elect  it  will  be  exposed  to  defeat  through 
a  division  of  its  voting  strength.  If  each  party  for  example  were 
to  nominate  three  candidates  as  the  Legislative  Voters'  League 
advocated,  the  majority  would  probably  elect  all  three  members 
and  the  system  of  minority  representation  would  break  down. 

In  his  general  evaluation  of  the  merits  and  demerits  of  the  sys- 
tem Professor  Moore  shows,  as  stated  above,  that  it  has  with  the 
few  exceptions  mentioned  enabled  the  minority  party  to  elect 
over  one-third  of  tlhe  members  of  the  house,  and  in  this  re- 
spect it  has  fulfilled  the  main  purpose  of  its  sponsors.  But  there 
is  no  evidence  that  it  has  resulted  in  the  election  of  representa- 
tives of  greater  ability  or  larger  breadth  of  view  than  were  elec- 
ted under  the  old  system  prior  to  1870  or  are  now  elected  in 
other  states.  Apart  therefore  from  the  advantage  of  insuring 
that  the  leading  minority  party  be  represented  by  a  certain 
number  of  its  own  adherents  the  system  does  not  appear  to  pos- 
sess any  particular  merit,  if  one  considers  only  the  intrinsic 
character  of  the  legislature  and  the  general  interests  of  the  state 
which  it  is  intended  to  serve. 

The  most  serious  defect  of  the  system  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  it  has  in  some  cases  resulted  in  the  election  of  a 
house  of  representatives  in  which  no  political  party  had  a  major- 
ity. In  such  a  house  no  party  possesses  power  or  responsibility ; 
party  strife  is  accentuated;  paralysis  is  apt  to  characterize  the 
proceedings  and  the  output  of  constructive  legislation  is  likely 
to  be  disappointing. 

Furthermore,  it  sometimes  results  under  the  cumulative  sys- 
tem that  the  party  which  elects  the  governor  has  only  a  small 
majority  of  the  representatives.  Under  these  circumstances  a 
few  members  may  hold  the  balance  of  power,  and  the  governor 
may  find  it  impossible  to  carry  out  the  legislative  program 


12  INTRODUCTION         .  [154 

upon  which  he  may  have  made  his  campaign  and  which  may 
have  received  the  endorsement  of  the  majority  of  the  voters. 
To  be  sure  this  situation  may,  and  sometimes  does,  happen  in 
other  states  where  the  cumulative  system  is  not  in  force,  but  it 
has  happened  more  frequently  in  Illinois  in  recent  years  than 
elsewhere. 

On  the  whole,  a  study  of  the  results,  and  they  have  been  set 
forth  by  Professor  Moore  in  a  fair  and  judicial  manner,  does  not 
quite  convince  one  that  the  system  is  superior,  if  the  general  in- 
terests of  the  state  as  a  whole  be  considered,  to  that  of  the  other 
states.  Certainly  many  of  the  advantages  claimed  for  it  in  the 
beginning  by  its  advocates  have  not  been  realized  in  fact,  and  it 
is  doubtful  whether  the  advantages  that  have  been  realized  have 
not  often  been  offset  by  the  disadvantages. 


CHAPTER  I 
NEW  METHODS  OF  REPRESENTATION 

Elections  by  pluralities  and  the  failure  of  large  groups  in 
each  community  to  obtain  representation  in  the  government  have 
led  to  the  proposal  of  numerous  remedies,  the  principal  of  which 
are  indicated  briefly  below. 

(1)  When  but  one  officer  is  to  be  elected,  plans  of  preferen- 
tial voting  have  been  proposed  whereby  the  voter  may  express 
his    second    or    further    choices.      Thus,    when    there    is    but 
one  official  to  be  elected  and  three  candidates,  no  one  of  the 
three  may  have  a  majority,  and  the  expression  of  second  and 
third  choices  may  indicate  an  actual  choice  of  the  majority  of 
the  voters.    Let  us  suppose  that  A  has  400  votes,  B,  300  votes  and 
C,  300  votes.     If  A  is  declared  elected  upon  the  basis  of  this 
vote  he  is  clearly  a  minority  choice  whereas  600  voters  may  pre- 
fer either  B  or  C  to  A.     The  expression  and  count  of  a  second 
choice  does,  it  is  claimed,  produce  a  better  representation  of 
public  sentiment  and  preferential  voting  of  this  character  has 
been  adopted  in  many  parts  of  the  world.     There  are  a  number 
of  methods  of  counting  second,  third  or  further  choices,  of  which 
the  best  known  in  this  country  (and  perhaps  the  least  satisfac- 
tory)  is  the  so-called  Bucklin  system,  first  applied  in  Grand 
Junction,  Colo.,  and  now  employed  in  Cleveland  and  other  cities. 

(2)  The  limited  vote.    Where  there  are  three  or  more  per- 
sons to  be  elected,  this  plan  has  occasionally  been  adopted.  For 
example,  if  three  candidates  are  to  be  elected,  each  voter  will  be 
given  but  two  votes,  and  the  majority  party  will  thus  be  able 
to  elect  only  two  candidates,  if  the  minority  party  is  fairly  strong 
and  is  well-disciplined.     Such  a  plan  will  normally  give  repre- 
sentation to  the  strongest  minority  party.    For  some  years  this 
plan  was  employed  in  the  election  of  aldermen  in  New  York  City 
and  in  Boston  and  is  also  used  in  the  election  of  judges  in  Penn- 
sylvania.   . 

(3)  Cumulative  voting,  of  which  the  most  striking  example 

13 


14  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION       [156 

is  that  of  Illinois,  to  which  this  study  is  devoted.  The  cumula- 
tive voting  system  provided  for  by  the  Illinois  constitution  of 
1870,  applies  to  a  district  electing  three  members,  and  gives  each 
voter  three  votes  to  cast  —  three  votes  for  one  candidate,  one 
and  one-half  votes  each  for  two  candidates,  or  one  vote  each  for 
three  candidates. 

(4)  Proportional  representation.  The  limited  vote  and  cu- 
mulative voting  obtain  a  representation  of  minorities,  but 
strengthen  the  party  organizations,  and  give  representation  or- 
dinarily to  the  two  strongest  parties  only.  The  ideal  of  propor- 
tional representation  is  that  representation  shall,  as  nearly  as 
possible,  be  in  mathematical  proportion  to  the  votes  cast  by  each 
separate  group  or  party.  If  a  district  elects  only  three  repre- 
sentatives, this  limitation  of  number  means  necessarily  that  at 
most  only  three  groups  of  voters  can  be  represented,  and  that 
usually  under  almost  any  system,  only  the  two  stronger  will  have 
representation.  Proportional  representation  therefore  requires 
larger  districts,  each  electing  a  greater  number  of  persons.  Sup- 
pose for  example,  a  district  which  has  70,000  voters  and  elects 
7  members.  A  mathematical  distribution  of  the  votes  of  the 
seven  members  might  be  as  follows: 

Kepublicans       30,000  votes  —  3  members 
Democrats         20,000  votes  —  2  members 
Progressives       10,000  votes  —  1  member 
Socialists  10,000  votes  —  1  member 

Even  with  larger  districts  and  with  a  scheme  that  will  count 
every  vote  effectively,  exact  mathematical  results  will,  of  course, 
not  be  obtained,  but  the  result  will  be  more  nearly  accurate 
than  under  cumulative  voting. 

The  several  plans  of  proportional  representation  involve  a 
considerable  amount  of  technicality,  though  the  actual  opera- 
tion of  the  several  systems  is  not  particularly  complex.  The 
two  plans  most  discussed  are  (1)  the  single  transferable  vote 
and  (2)  the  list  system.  Under  the  single  transferable  vote 
system,  the  voter  votes  for  but  one  candidate,  no  matter  how 
many  candidates  are  to  be  elected,  but  expresses  also  his  second, 
third  or  fourth  choices.  If  the  candidate  for  whom  he  votes 
has  more  than  enough  votes  to  be  elected,  the  surplus  votes  are 
transferred,  in  order  of  the  choice  expressed,  to  some  other 


157]  NEW   METHODS  OP    REPRESENTATION  15 

candidate  who  has  not  sufficient  votes;  in  this  manner  the  loss 
of  votes  is  reduced  to  the  minimum.  Under  the  single  trans- 
ferable vote  system  there  are  several  methods  of  counting,  the 
best  known  of  which  was  devised  by  Thomas  Hare.  Under  this 
scheme  parties  follow  the  usual  custom  of  designating  candi- 
dates, but  independent  candidates  may  also  be  freely  nom- 
inated.1 

The  list  system  is  best  known  through  its  use  in  Belgium. 
The  system,  as  used  in  that  country,  involves  the  presentation 
of  a  list  of  candidates  by  each  party,  the  voter  then  casting 
his  ballot  for  the  list  and  he  may  also  express  his  preference 
among  the  candidates  on  the  list.  Each  party  obtains  a  number 
of  seats  in  proportion  to  the  votes  cast  for  its  list.  The  party 
arranges  the  order  of  the  names  on  the  list  and  the  seats  appor- 
tioned to  each  party  go  to  the  candidates  in  this  order,  unless 
the  voters  have  expressed  a  different  preference.  Under  the 
Belgian  system  the  party  thus  not  only  designates  the  candidates 
but  normally  also  determines  the  order  in  which  they  shall  be 
declared  elected. 

Other  countries,  while  using  the  list  system  in  its  essentials 
as  described  above,  have  varied  it  in  details.  The  variations 
are  usually  designed  to  lessen  party  control  and  give  the  voter  a 
wider  freedom  of  choice. 

Above  are  described  the  principal  methods  which  have  been 
used  at  various  times  in  attempts  to  secure  a  fairer  representa- 
tion in  government  councils  than  is  afforded  by  the  ordinary 
plurality  method  of  election.  A  considerable  number  of  other 
schemes  have  been  applied  but  usually  they  are  fundamentally 
based  on  some  of  the  principles  indicated  above  though  they 
vary  somewhat  widely  in  details. 

The  founders  of  the  American  Republic  were  thoroughly 
imbued  with  the  spirit  of  equal  political  rights  to  all,  but  in  a 
country  so  extensive  and  populous  as  the  United  States,  direct 
participation  in  government  by  each  citizen  was  obviously  im- 
possible. To  avoid  this  difficulty  and  yet  apply  the  theory  to 
a  practical  government  a  representative  democracy  was  formed. 

i  For  a  judicial  discussion  of  the  constitutional  aspects  of  preferential 
voting  see  Brown  v.  Smallwood,  130  Minn.,  492,  and  cases  cited  therein; 
for  a  different  view  see  Orpen  v.  Watson,  87  N.  J.  Law,  69. 


16  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [158 

It  was  soon  apparent,  however,  that  the  scheme  adopted  se- 
cured only  partial  representation  inasmuch  as  officials  were 
sometimes  elected  by  an  actual  minority  of  the  voters  and  con- 
sequently large  classes  had  no  authorized  agent  in  the  legisla- 
tive councils. 

The  movement  for  representative  reform  was  not  accidental 
but  was  the  logical  result  of  prevailing  conditions  and  theories. 
During  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  various  states 
occupied  themselves  with  liberalizing  their  governments  and 
properly  distributing  political  power  among  the  legislative,  ju- 
dicial and  executive  departments.  When  this  was  accomplished 
to  some  degree  of  satisfaction  their  attention  was  next  turned 
to  securing  better  representation  for  minority  parties  and  fac- 
tions which  had  greatly  increased  because  of  the  wide  exten- 
sion of  the  elective  franchise  about  the  middle  of  the  last  cen- 
tury. In  England  there  was  a  particular  reason  for  advocating 
proportional  representation,  for  when  the  number  of  voters  was 
largely  augmented  in  1867,  the  aristocratic  and  landed  classes 
feared  that  they  would  be  entirely  excluded  from  representa- 
tion in  the  government  unless  some  form  of  minority  represen- 
tation should  be  provided.  The  political  leaders,  however,  were 
soon  convinced  that  they  had  nothing  to  fear,  at  that  time,  from 
the  newly  made  voters  and  consequently  lost  interest  in  the 
reform. 

While  active  agitation  for  representative  reform  began  about 
1865,  its  origin  can  be  traced  farther  back.  In  1814  Norway 
made  some  provisions  in  its  constitution  for  the  representation 
of  minority  parties.  During  the  discussion  on  the  Reform  Bill  in 
England  in  1832,  minority  representation  was  considered  but 
received  no  legal  recognition.  In  the  United  States  some  of  the 
states,  where  the  general  ticket  plan  of  election  prevailed,  were 
sending  single  party  delegations  to  Congress,  and  in  1842  that 
body  directed  that  Representatives  in  Congress  should  be  elec- 
ted by  the  district  method,  thus  insuring  better  representation 
for  both  parties  and  localities.  In  1845  the  Danish  government 
adopted  a  plan  of  proportional  representation. 

The  year  1844  marks  the  beginning  of  a  permanent  literature 
and  systematic  study  of  the  subject.  In  that  year  appeared 
Thomas  Gilpin's  work  entitled:  "On  the  Representation  of  Mi- 
norities of  Electors  to  Act  with  the  Majority  in  Elected  Assem- 


159]  NEW   METHODS  OF    REPRESENTATION  17 

blies,"  but  the  volume  attracted  little  attention  at  the  time  of 
its  publication.  Ten  years  later  James  Garth  Marshall  published 
his  "Majorities  and  Minorities:  Their  Relative  Rights,"  a  book 
which  contained  the  first  printed  account  of  the  cumulative 
vote.  In  1859  Thomas  Hare  produced  his  noted  volume,  "The 
Election  of  Representatives,  Parliamentary  and  Municipal." 
John  Stuart  Mill  became  an  advocate  of  representative  reform 
in  1865  and  popular  interest  in  the  scheme  was  now  fairly  well 
started. 

In  England  the  discussion  crystallized  into  law  in  1867  when 
the  limited  vote  was  adopted  for  parliamentary  districts  re- 
turning three  members.  In  1870  the  members  of  the  English 
school  boards  were  elected  by  the  cumulative  vote.  The  number 
of  places  to  be  filled  was  comparatively  large,  sometimes  as 
many  as  fifteen,  and  the  voters  manipulated  their  ballots  to 
suit  their  individual  tastes,  which  inevitably  resulted  in  con- 
fusion and  inequalities.  In  the  United  States,  during  the  period 
of  the  bitter  struggle  in  Congress  following  the  Civil  War,  the 
need  of  representative  reform  became  evident,  for  not  only  was 
the  Congress  then  sitting  representative  of  only  one  section  of 
the  country  but  fresh  in  the  minds  of  the  people  was  the  mem- 
ory of  a  great  war,  hastened,  if  not  brought  on,  by  the  action 
of  the  governing  bodies  in  which  the  radicals  of  both  sections 
predominated  to  the  exclusion  of  a  large  body  of  conservatives. 
In  1867  2  and  1869  3  Mr.  Buckalew  of  Pennsylvania  proposed 
in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  that  the  cumulative  vote  be 
applied  to  the  election  of  Representatives  in  Congress.  In 
1870  *  and  again  in  1871 5  the  subject  was  debated  in  Congress, 
but  this  body  was  not  inclined  to  make  concessions  to  the  Demo- 
cratic minority. 

Although  the  various  representative  reform  bills  failed  in 
Congress  more  success  was  attained  in  the  states.  In  1867 
New  York  used  the  limited  vote  in  the  election  of  delegates  to 
a  constitutional  convention.6  A  clause  providing  for  minority 
representation  in  the  state  legislature  was  incorporated  in  the 

2  Congressional  Globe,  40th  Congress,  1st  Session,  513. 

3  Congressional  Globe,  40th  Congress,  3rd  Session,  320. 

*  Congressional  Globe,  41st  Congress,  2nd  Session,  4735,  et  seq, 
s  Congressional  Globe,  42nd  Congress,  2nd  Session,  63,  110. 
e  Session  Laws,  1867;  Ch.  194,  286. 


18  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [160 

Illinois  constitution  of  1870.  The  cumulative  vote  was  applied 
to  municipal  elections  in  Pennsylvania  in  1871 7  and  to  Wil- 
mington, North  Carolina,  in  1872,8  but  in  both  cases  the  laws 
authorizing  this  were  soon  repealed.  In  the  latter  year,  in  an 
attempt  to  break  the  power  of  Tammany,  the  cumulative  vote 
was  provided  for  in  a  new  charter  for  the  city  of  New  York, 
but  the  Governor  interposed  his  veto.9  Pennsylvania  applied  the 
limited  vote  in  1873  to  the  election  of  certain  judicial  officers. 
By  constitutional  provisions  the  cumulative  vote  has  been  ap- 
plied to  the  election  of  directors  in  private  corporations  in  eleven 
states.10 

Popular  interest  in  the  reform  waned  after  1875  and  for 
some  years  it  made  but  little  progress.  Later,  however,  in- 
terest in  the  question  revived  both  in  the  United  States  and 
in  foreign  countries  and  more  recently  slow  but  continued  ad- 
vance has  been  made.  Ohio  "  in  1884  and  Michigan  12  in  1889 
made  a  limited  application  of  the  principle  of  minority  repre- 
sentation, but  in  both  cases  the  statutes  applying  the  theory 
were  held  to  be  unconstitutional.13  In  1891  South  Dakota  re- 
jected a  proposed  constitutional  amendment  providing  for  mi- 
nority representation  in  the  Legislature.  About  the  same  time 
several  of  the  Swiss  cantons  provided  for  proportional  repre- 
sentation, and  in  1899  Belgium  adopted  a  modification  of  the 
Swiss  plan  for  the  election  of  members  to  the  lower  house  of 
the  national  Legislature.  In  1900  Japan  provided  for  the  elec- 
tion of  members  to  the  popular  branch  of  parliament  by  a  pro- 
portional representation  scheme  of  the  single  non-transferable 
vote  type. 

During  the  last  decade  the  movement  for  a  more  representa- 

"  Session  Laws,  1871,  283. 

s  Private  Laws,  Session  1871-72,  139. 

9  Public  Papers  of  Governor  John,  T.  Hoffman,  353;  also  Journal  of  the 
Assembly,  New  York,  1872,  Vol.  2,  1596.     This  message  discusses  at  con- 
siderable length  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  minority  representa- 
tion. 

10  111.,  Neb.,  Gal.,  Pa.,  W.  Va.,  Miss.,  Idaho,  Ky.,  N.  Dak.,  Montana,  Mo. 
Commons,  "Proportional  ^Representation. " 

11  Session  Laws,  1884,  121. 

12  Session  Laws,  1889,  374. 

is  State  v.  Constantine,  42  Ohio,  437;  Maynard  v.  Board  of  Commission- 
ers, 84  Michigan,  228. 


161]  NEW   METHODS  OF    REPRESENTATION  19 

tive  system  of  electing  members  of  deliberate  bodies  has  made 
considerable  progress.  In  several  instances  countries  have  ex- 
perimented with  the  idea  of  proportional  representation  in  a 
restricted  manner,  as  for  example,  electing  a  limited  number  of 
representatives  under  the  system  rather  than  applying  the  prin- 
ciple to  the  whole  legislative  body. 

In  1906  provision  was  made  to  elect  the  Finnish  Diet  by 
proportional  representation,  but  later  this  was  interfered  with 
by  Eussia.  In  1908  a  statute  was  enacted  providing  for  the 
election  of  councilmen  in  the  Danish  cities  on  the  proportional 
basis,  and  in  1915  a  law  was  passed  providing  for  a  system  of 
proportional  representation  for  parliamentary  elections  which 
is  combined  with  a  system  of  single  member  districts.  The  first 
election  under  the  system  was  held  in  April,  1918.14 

In  1909  Tasmania  made  general  what  had  previously  been 
applied  only  partially  and  provided  for  the  election  of  all  mem- 
bers of  Parliament  by  a  proportional  scheme.  In  the  same  year 
Sweden  arranged  for  the  election  of  members  of  both  houses 
of  Parliament  and  the  committees  of  those  houses  by  the  list 
system ;  a  similiar  plan  was  also  applied  to  the  election  of  mem- 
bers of  the  county  and  municipal  councils.  Likewise  in  1909 
South  Africa  applied  the  proportional  representation  idea  to 
the  election  of  members  of  the  Senate  and  also  to  the  elections 
in  a  limited  number  of  local  political  units. 

In  1913  the  Chinese  Parliament  was  elected  by  a  rather  crude 
system  of  proportional  representation.  Two  years  later  New  Zea- 
land provided  for  the  election  of  the  legislative  council  by  a  pro- 
portional representation  scheme,  and  also  made  the  plan  optional 
with  the  cities  for  the  election  of  local  officials. 

The  Russian  constituent  assembly,  chosen  in  1917,  was  elected 
on  a  proportional  basis.  The  same  year  Holland  adopted  the 
recommendation  of  a  commission  appointed  to  report  on  the  sub- 
ject, and  provided  for  the  election  of  the  lower  house  of  Parlia- 
ment and  for  the  provincial  and  municipal  councils  by  a  scheme 
of  proportional  representation  based  on  the  Hare  system.  In 
1918  the  lower  house  of  the  New  South  Wales  legislature  was 
chosen  on  a  proportional  basis.  Proportional  representation  is 

14  The  system  and  the  results  under  the  first  election  are  explained  in  the 
American-  Political  Science  Review  for  November,  1919. 


20  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION       [162 

provided  for  in  the  new  constitutions  of  Germany,  Czecho-Slo- 
vakia  and  Poland. 

In  1919  the  French  Parliament  after  long  discussion  of  the 
subject  and  much  agitation  throughout  the  country  enacted  a 
law  providing  for  a  system  of  proportional  representation  in 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Hereafter  every  department  will 
choose  as  many  deputies  as  it  has  multiples  of  75,000  inhabi- 
tants of  French  nationality.  Remainders  in  excess  of  37,500 
will  choose  an  additional  deputy.  Departments  whose  popula- 
tion entitle  them  to  more  than  six  deputies  will  be  divided  into 
sections  each  of  which  will  elect  three  deputies  according  to  the 
list  system.  The  first  elections  under  the  new  law  take  place  in 
November,  1919. 

In  England  in  recent  years  the  question  of  representative  re- 
form has  also  been  attracting  attention.  In  1906,  in  response  to 
an  address,  a  report  was  made  by  the  Foreign  Office  to  the 
House  of  Commons  indicating  what  representative  reforms  had 
been  made,  or  were  in  the  process  of  being  carried  out,  in  various 
foreign  countries.  At  the  close  of  1908  a  Royal  Commission  was 
appointed  to  investigate  the  various  schemes  adopted  or  pro- 
posed in  order  to  secure  a  fully  representative  character  for 
popularly  elected  legislative  bodies  and  to  consider  to  what 
extent  these  systems  might  be  applicable  to  the  English  elector- 
ate. This  Commission  conducted  quite  an  elaborate  investiga- 
tion. Because  of  the  peculiar  political  conditions  and  traditions 
of  England  this  Commission  was  unable  to  recommend  for  pre- 
sent adoption  the  transferable  vote  system  for  the  election  of  pol- 
itical officers.  The  Commission,  however,  did  recommend  the 
use  of  the  alternative  vote  in  those  constituencies  returning  more 
than  two  members. 

In  1910  Parliament  passed  an  act  authorizing  all  English  and 
Welsh  cities,  at  their  option,  to  apply  the  proportional  repre- 
sentation scheme  in  the  election  of  local  officials.  In  the  Home 
Rule  Bill  for  Ireland,  passed  in  1914,  proportional  representa- 
tion was  provided  for  the  Senate,  as  soon  as  popular  elections 
should  begin,  and  for  31  constituencies  returning  three  or  more 
members  to  the  lower  house. 

In  1918  "The  Representation  of  the  People  Act,"  passed  by 
Parliament,  provided  that  the  eleven  University  members  of  the 


163]  NEW   METHODS  OF    REPRESENTATION  21 

House  of  Commons  should  be  elected  by  the  Hare  System  of 
proportional  representation.  The  act  also  provided  for  the 
appointment  of  commissioners  to  prepare  a  scheme  for  the  elec- 
tion of  100  members  of  the  Commons  on  the  principle  of  pro- 
portional representation  for  those  constituencies  returning  three 
or  more  members.  This  commission  was  duly  appointed  and  in 
a  report  rendered  a  short  time  later  recommended  that  propor- 
tional representation  be  applied  in  certain  districts,  but  did  not 
propose  any  definite  plan,  and  none  has  as  yet  been  adopted. 

In  the  United  States  representative  reform  has  also  recently 
received  a  considerable  amount  of  attention,  mainly  in  the  cities, 
and  the  idea  has  made  no  very  definite  progress  in  any  political 
unit  of  a  larger  nature.  However,  in  1917,  Congress  arranged 
for  a  mild  form  of  proportional  representation  in  Porto  Eico. 
In  an  act  passed  in  March  15  of  that  year  it  is  provided  that  five 
of  a  total  of  nineteen  Senators  shall  be  elected  at  large,  each 
voter  to  have  one  vote  and  the  five  candidates  receiving  the  high- 
est number  to  be  declared  elected.  The  act  also  provides  that 
four  representatives  out  of  a  total  of  thirty-nine  are  to  be  elec- 
ted at  large  by  the  same  scheme. 

The  civic  awakening  in  American  cities  since  the  beginning 
of  this  century  which  has  resulted  in  various  changes  in  the 
structure  of  municipal  government,  such  as  the  commission 
plan  in  varying  forms  and  the  more  recent  city  manager,  has 
also  brought  with  it  serious  consideration  of  representative  re- 
form. While  the  latter  has  been  discussed  in  a  considerable 
number  of  instances  in  connection  with  municipal  reforms,  in 
but  a  few  cases  up  to  the  present  has  proportional  representa- 
tion been  actually  adopted. 

In  1915  Ashtabula,  Ohio,  adopted  a  charter  which  provided 
for  the  election  of  a  council  of  seven  at  large  from  the  city  by 
proportional  representation,  using  the  quota  system.  The  first 
election  under  this  charter  was  held  in  November,  1915.  There 
were  fourteen  candidates  for  the  seven  places  and  3,334  ballots 
were  cast.  Practical  difficulties  in  counting  the  votes  under  this 
system  did  not  seem  to  appear  and  the  council  elected  was  of  a 
representative  character.  The  second  election  was  held  in  No- 
vember, 1917,  and  the  immediate  results  seem  to  be  satisfactory. 

is  If.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  Vol.  39,  959. 


22  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [164 

Boulder,  Colorado,  a  city  with  a  population  of  about  12,000, 
adopted  in  the  latter  part  of  1917  a  new  charter  providing  for 
a  council  of  nine  members,  three  to  be  chosen  every  two  years 
and  each  group  of  three  to  be  elected  by  the  Hare  system  of 
proportional  representation.  One  election  has  been  held  under 
this  charter,  and  no  practical  difficulties  seem  to  have  been  en- 
encountered  in  either  casting  or  counting  the  votes. 

In  the  early  part  of  1918,  Kalamazoo,  Michigan,  adopted  a 
charter  which  provides  for  a  city  council  of  seven  members  to  be 
elected  at  large  under  the  Hare  system  of  proportional  repre- 
sentation. At  the  first  election  held  under  the  new  charter, 
twenty-three  candidates  appeared.  Unfortunately  issues  other 
than  local  become  involved.  The  election  was  held  during  war 
times  and  questions  of  loyalty  were  injected  into  the  campaign. 
One  candidate  classed  as  a  socialist  and  radical  was  bitterly  at- 
tacked. Nevertheless  he  was  elected,  and  this  at  the  time  caused 
considerable  dissatisfaction  and  adverse  criticism  on  the  part  of 
certain  classes.  However,  the  fact  that  such  a  candidate  could 
be  elected  under  the  circumstances  is  a  good  proof  of  the  repre- 
sentative results  secured  by  the  system,  as  a  limited  number  of 
voters,  which  otherwise  would  have  been  hopelessly  outnumbered, 
were  able  to  select  the  candidate  of  their  choice. 

That  a  theory  which  contains  so  much  inherent  justice  has 
failed  to  receive  wider  application  is  due  to  a  variety  of  causes, 
the  most  important  of  which  are  the  practical  defects  of  the  vari- 
ous plans  tried  and  the  failure  to  protect  them  from  abuse. 
Moreover,  the  enactment  of  such  a  law  involves  giving  large 
power  to  an  opposing  minority  and  such  self-sacrifices  are  not 
common  in  the  history  of  political  parties. 

Since  the  adoption  of  the  proportional  representation  scheme 
by  the  cities  of  this  country  has  been  so  recent,  it  is  as  yet  im- 
possible to  ascertain  with  any  certainty  the  merits  of  the  plan 
as  determined  by  actual  tests  in  the  municipalities.  In  two 
states,  however,  Illinois  and  Pennsylvania,  minority  representa- 
tion has  extended  over  a  period  of  time  sufficiently  long  to 
afford  it  an  opportunity  to  work  out  logical  results.  The  con- 
stitution of  Pennsylvania,  in  a  special  provision  for  Philadelphia, 
provides  that  in  the  election  of  city  magistrates,  "No  voter 
shall  vote  for  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  number  of  persons 


165]  NEW   METHODS  OF    REPRESENTATION  23 

to  be  elected  when  more  than  one  are  to  be  chosen. ' ' 1G  The 
constitution  also  states  that  "Whenever  two  judges  of  the  su- 
preme court  are  to  be  chosen  for  the  same  time  of  service,  each 
voter  shall  vote  for  one  only,  and  when  there  are  three  to  be 
chosen  he  shall  vote  for  no  more  than  two."17  Although  ex- 
cellent judges  have  generally  been  chosen,  yet  the  limited  vote 
seems  to  be  regarded  as  a  useless  complication  and  will  probably 
be  dropped  at  the  first  opportunity. 


i«  Constitution  of  1873,  Art.  5,  Sec.  12. 
IT  Constitution  of  1873,  Art.  5,  Sec.  16. 


CHAPTER  II 
ADOPTION  OF  THE  CUMULATIVE  SYSTEM  IN  ILLINOIS 

In  Illinois  the  defects  of  the  second  constitution,  especially 
the  legislative  provisions,  were  constantly  becoming  more  ap- 
parent to  political  leaders,  and  in  1862  an  unsuccessful  attempt 
was  made  to  remodel  the  organic  law  of  the  state.1  As  soon  as 
the  Civil  War  was  over  constitutional  reform  was  again  con- 
sidered, and  the  question  of  calling  a  convention  was  referred 
to  the  people  for  decision.  Although  there  was  practically  no 
opposition  the  indifference  was  so  great  that  the  proposition  was 
carried  by  a  very  small  majority.  Delegates  were  duly  elected 
and  the  convention  met  December  13,  1869.  The  assembly  was 
probably  the  ablest  body  that  ever  met  in  the  state,  a  large  num- 
ber of  the  members  having  had  extensive  experience  in  public 
affairs.  The  first  week  was  consumed  in  organizing  and  on  De- 
cember 20th  the  standing  committees  were  announced.2  One 
of  these  was  designated  as  the  Committee  on  Electoral  and  Re- 
presentative Reform,  Joseph  Medill  of  Chicago  being  chairman. 
The  fact  that  this  committee  included  some  of  the  best  known 
and  ablest  men  in  the  assembly  shows  how  important  the  con- 
vention considered  the  need  of  representative  reform.  The  peo- 
ple at  large,  however,  judging  from  the  small  number  of  peti- 
tions sent  in  to  the  committee,  took  but  little  interest  in  the  sub- 
ject. A  few  petitions  proposing  various  plans  of  proportional  re- 
presentation were  received,  and  at  least  one  remonstrance  against 
the  adoption  of  any  such  innovation  was  presented.3 

On  February  10,  1870,  the  committee  made  a  report  em- 
bodied in  five  sections.  The  first  provides  for  the  ratio  of  sen- 
atorial representation;  the  second,  that  three  times  the  number 
required  for  a  senatorial  ratio  should  constitute  a  senatorial 

i  See  O.  M.  Dickerson,  '  <  The  Constitution  of  1862, ' '  University  of  Illi- 
nois Studies,  Vol.  1,  No.  9. 

-  Debates  and  Proceedings,  Constitutional  Convention,  Vol.  1,  75. 
s  Ibid.,  703. 

24 


167]  ADOPTION  OF  THE  CUMULATIVE  SYSTEM  25 

district,  each  of  which  should  choose  three  senators.  Similiar 
provisions  are  made  for  representatives  and  representative  dis- 
tricts. Sections  three  and  four  are  "floater"  clauses,  providing 
that  in  case  any  district  should  have  a  fraction  of  population 
above  the  ratio  so  large  that  being  multiplied  by  the  number  of 
regular  sessions  of  the  legislature  in  a  decade  the  result  should 
be  equal  to  one  or  more  ratios,  that  district  should  elect  an 
extra  representative  or  senator  in  those  years  in  which  the  frac- 
tion so  multiplied  would  produce  a  whole  ratio. 

The  fifth  section  states  that  "In  all  elections  of  Senators  and 
Representatives  each  qualified  voter  shall  be  entitled  to  as  many 
votes  as  there  are  Senators  or  Representatives  to  be  elected  by  the 
same  constituency  and  may  distribute  them  (or  equal  fractions 
thereof),  equally  or  unequally  among  the  candidates  or  concen- 
trate them  upon  one,  at  his  option ;  and  the  candidate  highest  in 
votes  shall  be  declared  elected. ' ' 4 

The  committee's  recommendations  were  taken  up  in  the  con- 
vention on  May  6th  and  the  chairman  then  offered  a  substitute 
for  the  previous  report.  This  substitute  is  much  shorter  than 
the  original  provision  and  consists  of  but  three  sections.  The 
first  provides  that  the  apportionment  for  the  Senate  shall  be 
made  every  ten  years,  beginning  with  1871 ;  the  second,  that  the 
House  of  Representatives  shall  consist  of  three  times  the  number 
of  the  members  of  the  Senate,  and  that  three  Representatives 
shall  be  elected  in  each  senatorial  district. 

Section  three  contains  the  cumulative  voting  provision  and 
is  as  follows:  "In  all  elections  of  Representatives  aforesaid 
each  qualified  voter  may  cast  as  many  votes  for  one  candidate 
as  there  are  Representatives  to  be  elected,  or  may  distribute  the 
same,  or  equal  parts  thereof,  among  the  candidates  as  he  may 
see  fit;  and  the  candidate  highest  in  votes  shall  be  declared 
elected."5 

The  report  also  recommended  that  these  sections  be  submitted 
to  the  people  as  a  distinct  proposition,  separate  from  the  main 
body  of  the  constitution,  for  their  rejection  or  approval. 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  above  that  cumulative  voting  was 
to  be  restricted  to  election  of  members  of  the  lower  house  of  the 

*  Debates  and  Proceedings,  Constitutional  Convention,  Vol.  1,  561. 
s  Ibid.,  Vol.  2,  1726 


26  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [168 

legislature  instead  of  applying  to  both  houses  as  in  the  original 
report.  Also  the  "floater"  idea  was  entirely  abandoned. 

The  argument  accompanying  the  report  is  a  summary  of  the 
theories  of  the  times  regarding  minority  representation.  The 
first  part  is  devoted  to  a  review  of  the  general  theory  of  the 
subject,  pointing  out  the  injustice  and  inequalities  of  the  usual 
majority  rule  and  showing  how  unrepresentative  most  delibera- 
tive bodies  really  are.  An  argument  is  then  presented  for  the 
particular  system  recommended.  It  is  asserted  that  obviously 
single  member  districts  could  give  no  opportunity  for  anything 
but  majority  rule,  while  two  member  districts  might  easily  afford 
the  minority  undue  power,  hence  the  smallest  district  that  would 
make  minority  representation  possible  is  a  three-member  one. 
The  districts  should  be  as  small  as  possible  consistent  with  the 
ends  sought,  so  as  to  make  the  members  representative  of  lo- 
calities and  also  do  as  little  violence  as  possible  to  existing  cus- 
toms. 

The  argument  which  applies  especially  to  local  conditions  and 
at  the  time  the  most  effective  one  in  the  entire  report,  is  that 
referring  to  sectional  representation.  It  is  stated  that  since 
1854,  with  few  exceptions,  all  the  senators  and  representa- 
tives in  the  northern  half  of  Illinois  had  been  of  one  political 
party,  while  the  legislators  from  the  other  half  of  the  state,  with 
equally  few  exceptions,  had  been  of  the  opposing  party.  In 
round  numbers,  100,000  Republicans  living  south  of  the  state 
capital  had  been  practically  disfranchised  and  almost  as  many 
Democrats  in  the  northern  districts  had  suffered  from  the  same 
discrimination.  It  is  pointed  out  that  if  alternate  districts 
throughout  the  state  were  Republican  and  Democratic,  condi- 
tions would  not  be  so  bad  as  where  an  entire  section  was  wholly 
under  the  domination  of  one  or  the  other  party,  but  such  was 
distinctly  not  the  case.  An  examination  of  statistics  showed 
also  that  in  the  previous  legislature  a  minority  of  electors  had 
elected  a  majority  of  representatives  in  that  body. 

The  freedom  and  power  of  the  voter  is  also  emphasized  in 
the  report.  Under  the  ordinary  election  method,  when  more 
than  one  official  is  to  be  chosen  for  an  office,  if  a  voter  objects 
to  any  one  candidate,  and  refuses  to  vote  for  him,  he  simply 
loses  a  portion  of  his  privilege.  Under  the  cumulative  method, 


169]  ADOPTION  OF  THE  CUMULATIVE  SYSTEM  27 

or  "free  ballot,"  as  it  was  called,  he  may  transfer  his  entire 
vote  to  other  candidates  and  hence  lose  nothing.  The  argument 
concludes  with  a  glowing  account  of  the  benefits  which  would 
result  from  the  proposed  reform.  "The  adoption  of  this  great 
reform  would  do  much  towards  abating  the  baneful  spirit  of 
partisan  animosity  and  removing  the  temptations  and  opportuni- 
ties which  now  exist  for  the  corrupt  use  of  money  at  elections. 
It  will  also  tend  powerfully  to  relieve  the  voter  from  the  des- 
potism of  party  caucuses,  and  at  the  same  time  constrain  party 
leaders  to  exercise  more  care  in  selecting  candidates  for  law- 
makers. There  is  nothing  which  will  more  effectually  put  an 
end  to  packing  conventions  than  arming  the  voter  with  the  three- 
shooter  or  triple  ballot,  whereby  he  may  fire  'plumpers'  for  the 
candidate  of  his  choice  and  against  those  of  his  aversion.  It 
will  increase  the  usefulness  of  the  legislature  by  improving  the 
membership.  It  will  enable  the  virtuous  citizens  to  elect  the  ab- 
lest and  purest  men  in  their  midst  and  secure  to  the  legislative 
councils  a  large  measure  of  popular  confidence  and  respect. ' ' 6 
After  briefly  considering  the  report,  the  convention,  by  a 
large  majority,  adopted  all  its  sections,  but  as  it  was  distinctly 
understood  that  this  was  simply  referring  the  question  to  the 
people  the  vote  did  not  necessarily  reflect  the  sentiment  of  the 
convention,  nor  was  there  any  debate  on  the  subject  which 
would  indicate  the  individual  opinions  of  the  members.  At  the 
popular  election  the  people,  by  99,022  affirmative  and  70,080 
negative  votes,  adopted  the  scheme.  The  advocates  of  the  meas- 
ure rejoiced  that  Illinois  was  thus  the  first  state  to  inaugurate 
this  democratic  and  beneficent  reform  in  the  choice  and  con- 
struction of  the  legislature,  and  was  thus  to  stand  as  the  pioneer 
m  a  movement  which  they  thought  would  strengthen  and  purify 
our  political  system  and  which  would  eventually  be  universally 
applied.  Across  the  Atlantic  the  "London  Times,"  in  its  issue 
of  January  13,  1870,  in  discussing  the  subject,  said:  "And  in 
Illinois,  and  what  Illinois  thinks  today  the  Union  will  think  to- 
morrow, the  discussion  is  passing  from  theory  to  practical  ap- 
proval. ' ' 


s  Debates  and  Proceedings,  Constitutional  Convention,  Vol.  1,  563. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    DEGREE    OF   MINORITY   REPRESENTATION 
SECURED  BY  THE  CUMULATIVE  SYSTEM 

In  the  preceding  chapter  the  conditions  prevailing  at  the 
time  of  the  adoption  of  the  cumulative  system  of  voting  in 
Illinois  and  the  advantages  which  the  supporters  of  the  measure 
promised,  have  been  described.  It  is  now  proposed  to  consider 
the  actual  results  of  nearly  fifty  years '  practical  test  of  the  plan 
and  to  ascertain,  as  far  as  possible,  to  what  extent  the  method 
has  justified  the  expectations  of  its  advocates. 

A  question  that  logically  arises  at  once  is,  does  the  cumulative 
voting  system  always  give  in  each  district  a  minority  party 
representation?  The  answer  to  this  question,  with  a  few  rare 
exceptions  which  will  be  noted  later,  can  be  given  definitely  and 
decisively  in  the  affirmative.  In  every  senatorial  district  in  the 
state,  with  the  few  exceptions  mentioned,  at  least  two  parties 
and  occasionally  three  have  been  represented  in  the  lower  House 
of  the  Legislature.  The  time-honored  and  usual  practice  is  for 
the  majority  party  to  have  two  representatives  and  the  minority 
one,  with  ocasionally  a  third  party  candidate  defeating  one  of 
either  the  two  principal  party  nominees.  Although  there  have 
been  biennial  elections  in  each  of  the  fifty-one  districts  since 
1872  under  the  present  constitution,  in  but  six  instances  have 
all  three  representatives  been  the  regular  nominees  of  one  party.1 
In  several  other  instances  the  Republicans  have  had  nominally 
three  members  but  in  these  cases  one  or  two  of  the  representa- 
tives ran  on  independent  tickets  as  Independent  Republicans, 

i  These  instances  are:  District  No.  38  in  the  36th  General  Assembly 
(1888-1890)  when  the  Democrats  had  three  representatives.  Districts  Nos. 
5  and  10  in  the  40th  Assembly  (1896-98)  where  there  were  three  Repub- 
licans in  both  cases.  District  No.  27  in  the  47th  Assembly  (1910-12)  when 
the  Democrats  had  three  representatives.  Districts  Nos.  10  and  14  in  the 
51st  Assembly  (1918-20)  when  there  were  three  Republicans  elected  in  each 
case. 

28 


171]  THE  DEGREE  OF  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION  29 

and  were  not  regular  nominees  of  the  party.2  This  was  espe- 
cially true  of  the  elections  in  1874  for  the  Twenty-ninth  Assem- 
bly, when  in  many  districts  the  Democrats  nominated  no  can- 
didates and  helped  elect  the  independents. 

The  figures  show  that  the  cumulative  method  has  in  practic- 
ally all  cases  given  a  minority  party  representation,  but  this 
does  not  necessarily  imply  that  it  gives  exact  proportional  re- 
presentation. The  originators  of  the  scheme  did  not  assert  that 
it  would  secure  proportional  representation  to  any  degree  of 
exactness  but  contented  themselves  with  calling  the  plan  minor- 
ity representation.  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  system 
is  based  primarily  on  the  proportional  idea,  yet  so  far  as  the  two 
dominant  parties  are  concerned  it  has  led  to  a  proportional  re- 
presentation approaching  mathematical  exactness,  as  is  indicated 
by  Table  I. 

Absolute  conclusions  cannot  be  drawn  from  this  table  for 
any  one  year  because  of  the  fact  that  but  half  of  the  Sen- 
ate is  renewed  at  any  one  election.  Hence,  there  are  at  every 
session  50  per  cent  of  "holdovers"  in  the  Senate,  who  may  or 
may  not  represent  the  present  majority  party  in  their  respective 
districts,  and  this  may  operate  to  prevent  the  Senate  from  being 
as  representative  as  the  House.  As  a  whole  the  table  indicates 
how  nearly  each  House  has  come  to  representing  the  prevailing 

2  The  following  table  indicates  districts  and  time  of  such  occurrences: 
1874  —  29th  General  Assembly,  District  15,  1  regular  and  2  Independent 

Eepublicans. 
1874  —  29th  General  Assembly,  District  20,  2  regular  and  1  Independent 

Eepublican. 
1874  —  29th  General  Assembly,  District  23,  2  regular  and  1  Independent 

Eepublican. 
1874  —  29th  General  Assembly,  District  28,  2  regular  and  1  Independent 

Eepubliean. 
1874  —  29th  General  Assembly,  District  29,  2  regular  and  1  Independent 

Eepublican. 
1874  —  29th  General  Assembly,  District  30,  2  regular  and  1  Independent 

Eepublican. 
1874  —  29th  General  Assembly,  District  30,  2  regular  and  1  Independent 

Eepublicana. 
1874  —  29th  General  Assembly,  District  46,  1  regular  and  2  Independent 

Eepublicans. 
1886  —  35th  General  Assembly,  District  16,  2  regular  and  1  Independent 

Eepublican. 


30 


CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [172 


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173]  THE  DEGREE  OP  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION  31 

political  opinion  through  a  series  of  years,  and  a  close  correspon- 
dence will  be  found  between  the  ratios  indicated  in  columns 
5  and  7  of  the  table.  It  will  be  observed  that,  except  in  two 
instances  (1874  and  1884)  when  the  two  parties  approximated 
proportional  representation  in  both  houses,  the  lower  house 
comes  much  nearer  indicating  the  relative  strength  of  the  two 
dominant  parties  than  does  the  Senate.  The  variation  in  the 
House  in  1874,  when  the  minority  Democratic  party  had  con- 
siderably less  members  than  it  was  proportionately  entitled  to, 
was  due  to  the  Independents  winning  41  seats 3  at  the  expense  of 
the  Democrats.  The  variation  in  1912  when  the  Democrats,  then 
the  plurality  party,  had  more  than  their  proportional  share,  was 
due  to  the  Progressives  splitting  the  Republican  vote  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  Democrats.  The  variation  in  1902  can  only  be 
explained  by  unusual  local  conditions,  there  being  no  less  than 
fifteen4  so-called  parties  represented  by  candidates  at  the  gen- 
eral election.  This  alignment  apparently  operated  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  Democrats.  In  all  other  years  the  percentage  of 
votes  cast  corresponds  fairly  closely  to  the  percentage  of  mem- 
bers of  the  party  in  the  House. 

The  Senate  shows  a  wide  variation.  In  1904  and  1906,  the 
minority  party  had  less  than  half  the  number  of  senators  it 
was  entitled  to  as  compared  with  the  majority  party,  while  all 
the  years  (1874  and  1884  excepted)  show  a  large  discrepancy, 
the  majority,  as  is  to  be  expected,  usually  though  not  always 
having  more  members  than  its  just  proportion.  In  this  con- 
nection it  should  be  remembered  that  senators  and  representa- 
tives are  elected  from  the  same  districts. 

It  is  mathematically  demonstrable  that  any  party  which  is 
able  to  poll  more  than  one-fourth  of  the  votes  in  a  district  may, 
by  "plumping",  that  is,  casting  all  three  votes  for  one  man, 
elect  a  representative.  That  a  comparatively  small  vote  can 
thus  elect  a  member  presumably  would  operate  for  the  benefit 
of  third  parties,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  minor  parties  have 
had  but  few  representatives  in  the  House.  The  total  vote  which 

s  See  Moses,  Illinois:  Historical  and  Statistical,  Vol.  2,  1189. 

*  Republican,  Democratic,  Prohibition,  Socialist,  Socialist  Labor,  Peoples, 
Single  Tax,  Independent,  Independent  Republican,  Independent  Democrat, 
Independent  Labor,  Public  Ownership,  Union  Labor,  Progressive  Labor  and 
Progressive. 


32  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION       [174 

they  have  cast  in  the  state  as  a  whole  has  been  quite  large,  yet 
it  seldom  happens  that  any  minor  party  has  more  votes  than 
the  weaker  of  the  two  large  parties  in  any  one  district.  How- 
ever, with  the  exception  of  1872,  1892,  1894,  1900,  1908,  and 
1918,  third  party  men  have  been  in  every  legislature. 

Table  1  shows  to  what  extent  the  cumulative  vote  affords 
proportional  representation  when  only  the  two  dominant  parties 
are  considered.  Table  II  gives  the  total  legislative  vote,  the 
vote  by  parties,  and  the  actual  and  proportional  representation 
of  each  party  in  the  House  of  Representatives  from  1910  to 
1918. 

The  columns  indicating  the  number  elected  (3)  and  the  mathe- 
matical proportion  to  which  the  parties  would  have  been  en- 
titled (4),  show  that  the  larger  parties  gained  at  the  expense 
of  the  smaller  ones,  although  in  1912  the  Progressive  party  ob- 
tained all  the  seats  to  which  it  would  have  been  entitled  upon 
an  exact  proportional  basis. 

Opponents  of  the  cumulative  method  have  called  attention  to 
the  large  number  of  votes  cast  in  the  state  by  the  minor  parties 
which  elect  few  or  no  candidates.  In  the  election  of  1914,  the 
Progressive  and  Socialist  parties  and  Independents  had  in  the 
aggregate  476,875  votes  (not  voters),  which  was  about  seven- 
teen per  cent  of  the  total  vote,  yet  all  these  combined  elected  but 
four  members  of  the  House.  This  simply  establishes  what  has 
already  been  asserted,  that  the  cumulative  voting  plan  does  not 
claim  to  be  primarily  a  proportional  representation  scheme,  but 
a  minority  party  representation  device,  and  tfhe  tables  and  fig- 
ures cited  above  indicate  how  far  the  system  gives  a  minority 
party  representation  and  to  what  extent  it  gives,  or  fails  to  give, 
proportional  representation  to  all  parties. 

While  it  is  true  that  minor  parties  receive  no  great  benefit 
from  the  scheme,  the  defect  may  not  be  really  so  great  in  prac- 
tice as  it  appears.  The  principle  of  government  by  parties  is 
firmly  fixed  in  American  politics,  the  few  third  party  mem- 
bers of  legislative  bodies  are  not  taken  into  the  councils  of 
either  of  the  dominant  parties,  and,  except  in  the  unusual  cases 
where  they  happen  to  hold  the  balance  of  power,  they  are  given 
but  little  consideration  and  have  but  little  opportunity  to  exert 
any  influence.  Moreover,  where  a  large  number  of  parties  are 
represented,  a  legislative  body  almost  inevitably  degenerates 


175] 


THE  DEGREE  OP  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION 


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34  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [176 

into  a  mere  debating  society  and  hence  legislates  with  difficulty. 
This  is  well  illustrated  by  the  Twenty-ninth  assembly,  when  in 
the  Senate  there  were  24  Republicans,  19  Democrats  and  9  In- 
dependents, Liberals,  etc.  In  the  House,  the  Republicans  had 
69  members,  the  Democrats  42  and  there  were  41  Independents 
and  others  difficult  to  classify.5  The  proceedings  of  the  as- 
sembly were  marked  by  disgraceful  scenes  and  personal  combats, 
and  finally  it  adjourned  with  but  a  few  results  to  show  for  its 
labors.  Theoretically  it  may  be  very  proper  and  just  for  each 
faction  to  be  represented  in  exact  proportion  to  its  voting 
strength,  but  experience  scarcely  bears  out  the  practical  exped- 
iency of  such  a  theory. 

Since  at  legislative  elections  each  voter  is  allowed  "to  mul- 
tiply himself  three  times"  at  the  polls,  the  476,875  votes  cast 
in  the  state  securing  but  four  legislators  in  1914,  represent  ap- 
proximately 158,958  voters.  In  this  connection  it  is  only  neces- 
sary to  point  out  that  the  same  year  in  the  state  elections,  625, 
148  votes  were  cast  for  United  States  Senator  and  522,999  votes 
for  Treasurer,  which  elected  no  official  and  were  entirely  lost 
or  wasted. 

In  Cook  County  in  1918,  sixteen  out  of  nineteen  districts 
elected  Senators  and  128,932  votes  failed  to  secure  representa- 
tion. Had  elections  been  held  in  all  districts  and  the  ratio  of 
ineffective  votes  remained  the  same  for  the  three  districts  as  in 
the  other  sixteen  there  would  have  been  about  153,106  votes 
lost  in  the  county  as  compared  with  about  16,271  adherents  of 
minor  parties  who  cast  48,813  votes  in  Cook  County  and  whose 
votes  were  lost  in  the  election  to  the  House  of  Representatives. 

Although  the  cumulative  method  does  not  secure  exact  propor- 
tional representation  for  all  parties,  it  has  at  least  the  virtue  of 
approximating  it  much  more  closely  than  does  the  ordinary  ma- 
jority system  and  with  far  less  waste  of  votes  than  usually  pre- 
vails. 

It  is  evident  from  a  consideration  of  Table  I,  page  30,  that 
where  the  system  of  minority  representation  prevails,  gerry- 
mandering is  largely  shorn  of  its  viciousness.  When  some  mi- 

s Figures  taken  from  Moses,  Illinois:  Historical  and  Statistical,  829. 
These  figures  do  not  entirely  harmonize  with  newspaper  accounts,  due  prob- 
ably to  the  difficulty  of  classifying  some  members. 


177]        THE  DEGREE  OF  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION          35 

nority  party  is  practically  certain  of  securing  at  least  one  mem- 
ber out  of  three  in  each  district,  the  gross  inequalities  and  in- 
justice that  frequently  prevail  as  a  result  of  the  gerrymander 
must  be  greatly  reduced.  In  Massachusetts  in  1892  it  required 
16,560  Democrats  to  elect  one  State  Senator  and  only  6,182 
Republicans  to  accomplish  the  same  result.  In  other  words,  one 
Republican  equaled  two  and  two-thirds  Democrats.  In  1894 
Democratic  members  of  the  lower  house  of  the  General  Assem- 
bly of  New  York  received  an  average  of  21,783  votes  and  the 
Republicans  6,341.  In  Michigan  the  same  year,  using  the  vote 
for  Governor  as  a  basis,  the  Republicans  with  237,215  votes 
elected  99  members  of  the  lower  house  of  the  legislature  while 
the  Democrats  with  130,823  votes  secured  but  one.  In  Ohio  in 
1892  one  Republican  vote  for  legislators  was  equal  to  nearly  two 
and  one-fourth  Democratic  votes.6  In  Illinois  in  1912,  the  Demo- 
crats on  an  average  elected  a  member  of  Congress  for  every 
23,059  votes  cast,  while  it  required  72,988  Republican  votes  to 
elect  a  member.  In  the  Missouri  congressional  elections  in  1914 
a  Democratic  vote  was  five  times  as  effective  in  electing  a  mem- 
ber as  was  a  Republican  vote.  In  the  same  year  in  Iowa,  159, 
232  Democratic  votes  elected  one  Congressman  while  207,472  Re- 
publican votes  elected  ten  members.  In  Illinois  in  the  elections 
of  1916,  each  Democratic  Congressman  received  on  an  average 
92,037  votes,  while  the  average  for  the  successful  Republican 
candidates  was  33,158.  In  Illinois  in  1918  it  required  14,238 
Republican  and  23,285  7  Democratic  votes  to  elect  a  State  Sena- 
tor, while  for  the  House,  with  the  cumulative  method,  in  the 
same  year  16,070  Republicans  and  17,309  Democratic  votes  elec- 
ted a  Representative.  The  last  apportionment  was  made 
in  1901  when  the  Republicans  had  a  majority  in  both  houses, 
and  they  were  probably  as  keenly  alive  to  the  party  advantage 
as  any  body  of  legislators.  While  the  House  vote  shows  some 
variation  and  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  ideal,  nevertheless  it 
has  none  of  those  glaring  inequalities  so  frequently  prevalent 

6  Figures  for  Mass.,  N.  Yt)  Michigan,  Ohio,  compiled  from  statistics 
given  in  Commons  ' '  Proportional  Representation. ' ' 

?  In  1918  out  of  26  districts,  18  Republican  Senators  were  elected  by  a 
vote  of  255,299  and  8  Democrats  by  a  vote  of  186,284.  The  Socialists 
polled  27,560  votes  for  the  Senate. 


36  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION       [178 

as  the  result  of  the  inherent  injustice  of  the  majority  system 
combined  with  the  consummation  of  political  art  in  juggling  dis- 
trict boundary  lines. 

The  constitution  provides  that  "In  all  elections  of  Repre- 
sentatives aforesaid,  each  qualified  voter  may  cast  as  many 
votes  for  one  candidate  as  there  are  Representatives  to  be  elect- 
ed, or  may  distribute  the  same,  or  equal  parts  thereof,  among 
the  candidates  as  he  shall  see  fit. " 8  Leaving  the  voter  really 
free,  without  the  restrictions  of  party  discipline,  to  cast  these 
three  votes  as  he  sees  fit  might  easily  lead  to  an  enormous  waste 
of  votes  by  "plumping"  on  one  candidate,  thus  giving  him  far 
more  votes  than  necessary  to  elect,  while  a  minority  by  judic- 
iously distributing  its  votes  might  elect  two  candidates  and  se- 
cure more  than  its  just  share  of  power. 

It  is  frequently  asserted  by  the  opponents  of  the  cumulative 
method  that  by  means  of  it  minority  parties  do  often  secure 
undue  representation.  Whether  this  assertion  is  correct  or 
not  depends  very  largely  upon  one's  view  regarding  the  rights 
of  minorities.  If,  as  asserted  by  some  violent  partisans,  the 
minority  has  few  or  no  rights  that  must  be  respected  by  the  ma- 
jority, and  as  the  majority  party  alone  is  responsible  for 
policies  or  legislation,  this  party  should  have  a  free  hand, 
then  the  cumulative  vote  does  give  a  minority  party  excessive 
representation.  If,  however,  the  more  sane  and  just  assump- 
tion is  made  that  a  minority  has  certain  rights  which  a  majority 
is  ethically  bound  to  respect,  and  that  the  minority  is  entitled 
to  about  the  same  ratio  of  representation  in  the  legislative 
body  as  it  bears  to  the  whole  body  politic,  there  is  still  some 
question  as  to  whether  the  minority  does  not  secure  more  re- 
presentation than  it  justly  deserves.  The  possibility  of  this  may 
be  illustrated  mathematically  by  the  following  hypothetical 
case.  The  majority  of  a  district  casts  18,000  votes  and  the  mi- 
nority 16,000.  A  and  B  are  majority  and  C  and  D  are  minority 
candidates.  A,  for  some  reason,  attracts  more  than  his  share 
of  votes  and  receives  11,000,  leaving  7,000  for  B.  The  minority 
candidates  run  more  evenly  and  each  receives  8,000  votes.  The 
result  manifestly  is  that  a  party,  while  casting  an  actual  minor- 
ity of  the  total  vote,  has  elected  two  out  of  three  members.  This 

s  Article  IV,  See.  7. 


179]        THE  DEGREE  OF  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION          37 

is  an  undesirable  condition,  but  one  which  actually  occurs  so 
seldom  that  it  does  not  constitute  a  very  formidable  objection. 
Such  inequalities  are  found  occasionally  but  almost  invariably 
in  districts  where  the  two  parties  are  of  nearly  equal  voting 
strength.  In  some  cases  the  defect  has  been  the  result  of 
"plumping",  but  frequently  such  miscarriages  occur  in  dis- 
tricts so  close  that  a  few  votes  either  way  would  change  the  re- 
sult of  the  election. 

Table  III  indicates  the  districts  in  which  such  mishaps  have 
occured  and  the  vote  in  each  case. 

It  will  be  seen  that  there  have  been  forty-seven  cases  in  which 
the  minority  clearly  had  an  undue  share  of  representation.  In 
six  cases  (Nos.  3,  13,  15,  22,  23,  26)  this  was  caused  by  over- 
conservatism  of  the  party  managers  or  by  inaccurate  estimation 
by  the  dominant  party  of  its  voting  strength,  as  shown  by  its 
failure  to  nominate  more  than  one  candidate.  In  eight  in- 
stances (Nos.  1,  8,  9,  11,  14,  20,  28,  42)  the  contest  was  so  close, 
and  such  a  small  number  of  votes  would  have  turned  the  scale, 
that  a  party  which  thus  lost  a  representative  could  have  but 
little  ground  for  complaint  of  injustice.  In  three  instances 
(Nos.  4,  34  and  47)  the  majority  failed  to  elect  its  quota  be- 
cause it  had  three  candidates  in  the  field.  In  ten  instances, 
(Nos.  31,  32,  33,  35,  36,  37,  38,  40,  43,  46),  a  party  failed  to 
elect  its  due  quota  because  of  the  fact  that  one  or  more  of  the 
opposition  parties  nominated  but  one  candidate  and  concen- 
trated on  him,  while  the  losing  party  divided  its  vote  between  two 
candidates  and  consequently  failed  to  secure  the  representation 
to  which  the  number  of  its  voters  entitled  it.  In  the  remain- 
ing twenty  cases  there  is  evidence  of  "plumping"  to  a  greater 
or  less  extent  within  the  party.  This  was  sometimes  caused  by 
the  apparent  great  personal  popularity  of  one  candidate,  some- 
times because  one  was  backed  by  an  aggressive  "machine,"  but 
more  frequently  where  two  or  more  counties  are  joined  to 
make  up  a  district  one  county  "knifed"  a  candidate  from  an- 
other and  "plumped"  for  the  "home"  man,  thus  getting  local 
revenge  at  the  expense  of  the  party  and  of  fair  representation. 

A  study  of  Table  III  shows  the  years  1910,  1912  and  1914 
to  have  the  greatest  number  of  districts  in  which  a  minority 
elected  a  majority  of  the  representatives.  This  may  be  explain- 


38  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [180 


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THE  DEGREE  OF  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION 


39 


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40  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [182 

ed  in  1910  because  of  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  people  with 
political  conditions  resulting  in  a  vigorous  campaign  waged 
against  corrupt  legislative  methods.  Bribery  and  corruption 
in  Illinois  had  become  a  matter  of  national  disgrace.  Another 
fact,  which,  combined  with  the  cumulative  vote,  made  unequal 
representation  possible  in  1910  was  the  very  close  vote  of  the 
leading  parties  in  the  34th  and  42nd  districts.  Furthermore, 
the  insurgent  Republican  movement  did  much  to  disrupt  Re- 
publican strength.9  In  1912  the  miscarriages  which  occurred  in 
eleven  districts  were  due  to  the  coming  into  existence  of  a  strong 
third  party,  which  developed  unforeseen  strength  and  upset  the 
calculations  of  the  committees  which  determined  the  number  of 
nominees  to  be  presented.  In  nine  of  these  districts  Progres- 
sive candidates  were  elected  and  in  two  Socialists  gained  seats. 
In  1914  the  discrepancy  was  mainly  due  to  the  Progressive  vote, 
an  aftermath  of  the  great  campaign  waged  in  1912.  The  years 
1916  and  1918  are  again  normal,  there  being  only  one  instance 
of  excessive  representation  in  1916  and  none  in  1918. 

From  the  viewpoint  of  party  representation  in  the  legislature, 
these  cases  offset  each  other  to  a  considerable  extent.  Thus  in 
1912,  with  11  cases  of  over-representation  by  a  minority,  one 
major  party  lost  five  seats  and  gained  the  same  number;  the 
other  major  party  lost  six  seats  and  gained  three,  a  net  loss  of 
three,  which  were  gained  by  two  minor  parties. 

Table  III  covers  a  period  of  24  elections  in  51  districts,  the 
minority  securing  more  than  its  due  share  of  representatives  in 
about  four  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of  elections.  Whether 
due  to  " plumping"  or  other  causes  the  proportion  of  "mishaps" 
is  small  and  the  system  has  so  seldom  been  subverted  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  defeat  the  will  of  the  majority  that  there  can  be 
no  serious  accusation  against  the  cumulative  method  in  this  re- 
gard. 

It  has  been  asserted  that  because  of  the  peculiar  method  of 
electing  representatives,  the  party  carrying  the  state  elections 
may  fail  to  secure  the  majority  in  the  legislature  to  which  it  is 
entitled.  The  example  cited  is  that  of  the  year  1890,  when  the 
Democrats,  for  the  first  time  in  years,  secured  the  small  number 
of  state  officers  elected  that  fall.  In  the  Senate  the  Republicans 

9  For  parties  and  votes  cast,  see  Table  II. 


183]  THE  DEGREE  OF  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION  41 

had  27  and  the  Democrats  24  members.  In  the  House  there 
were  73  Republicans,  77  Democrats  and  3  Farmers'  Alliance 
members,  the  latter  thus  holding  the  balance  of  power  on  joint 
ballot.  The  above  figures  show  that  so  far  as  the  House  was  con- 
cerned the  Democrats  did  have  a  small  majority,  and  the  failure 
to  secure  a  majority  on  joint  ballot  was  due  to  the  non-repre- 
sentative character  of  the  Senate,  since  of  the  26  Senators  who 
held  over  16  were  Republicans.  A  more  recent  instance  in  which 
no  party  had  a  working  majority  in  the  House  occurred  in  1912 
when  the  Democrats  elected  72  members,  the  Republicans  52, 
the  Progressives  26  and  the  Socialists  3.  In  this  instance  also 
there  can  be  no  complaint  of  injustice  against  the  cumulative 
vote  since  the  Democrats  cast  a  plurality  of  votes  in  the  state  in 
1912  and  also  had  a  plurality  of  members  in  the  House. 

Partisans  are  inclined  to  assert  that  great  harm  may  be  done 
the  majority  by  a  minority  securing  undue  representation  at 
certain  critical  times.  This  was  most  apparent  when  in  former 
times  a  United  States  Senator  was  to  be  elected  by  the  legisla- 
ture and  the  classical  example  given  is  the  senatorial  election 
of  1877.  In  the  elections  of  1876  the  Republicans  cast  for  Presi- 
dent 278,232  votes  and  the  Democrats  258,601.  In  the  legisla- 
ture which  assembled  in  1877  as  the  result  of  the  fall  elections, 
there  were  in  the  Senate  21  Republicans,  22  Democrats  and  8 
Independents.  In  the  House  the  Republicans  counted  79,  the 
Democrats  67  and  7  Independents,  thus  giving  a  small  faction 
the  balance  of  power  on  joint  ballot.  The  Independents  clung 
obstinately  to  their  Senatorial  candidate  (Judge  David  Davis) 
and  finally  the  Democratic  vote  was  transferred  to  him,  thus 
giving  the  required  majority,  and  the  Republicans  failed  to 
secure  an  office  they  claimed  was  justly  theirs.  Such  an  occur- 
rence is  simply  an  illustration  of  the  occasional  extraordinary 
influence  of  a  small  group  holding  the  balance  of  power.  This 
may  and  does  happen  under  any  system  of  election  and  is  not 
a  defect  peculiar  to  the  cumulative  system.  Indeed,  in  this  case 
the  Republicans  had  a  majority  in  the  House,  elected  by  the 
cumulative  method. 

Another  objection  to  minority  representation  is  that  in  case 
of  the  death  or  resignation  of  a  House  member  the  majority 
party  would  elect  the  new  member  of  that  district  regardless  of 


42  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [184 

the  politics  of  the  ex-member.  In  exceptional  cases,  when  the 
vote  is  close  and  party  lines  tightly  drawn,  this  might  give  a 
party  a  majority  to  which  it  is  not  justly  entitled  and  might 
be  of  considerable  importance.  In  many  legislatures  in  Illinois 
vacancies  have  been  caused  by  death  or  resignation,  yet  no  great 
injustice  has  ever  been  worked  in  filling  these  and  the  likeli- 
hood of  such  events  causing  party  disaster  is  so  remote  as  to  be 
scarcely  worthy  of  consideration.10 

Still  another  objection  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the 
House  of  Representatives  elected  under  the  cumulative  system 
may  be  controlled  by  a  different  party  from  that  which  is  in 
control  of  the  executive  department.  This  was  the  case  in 
1915-16.  This  situation  may  exist  but  it  also  occurs  in  other 
states  where  the  cumulative  system  does  not  prevail ;  and  is  due 
to  the  election  of  members  of  the  legislature  in  the  middle  of 
the  governor's  term. 


10  What  has  actually  happened  has  been  exactly  the  reverse  of  the  above. 
In  1885  on  the  death  of  a  member  of  the  House,  Senator  Logan  by  con- 
summate political  skill  secured  the  election  of  a  Eepublican  member  from 
a  strongly  Democratic  district,  and  waa  as  a  result,  elected  to  succeed  him- 
self as  United  States  Senator. 


CHAPTER  IV 
PRIMARY  LEGISLATION  AND  ITS  EFFECT. 

Prior  to  the  campaign  of  1904  the  only  legislation  for  the 
control  of  party  nominations  in  Illinois  had  been  aimed  at  cor- 
rupt practices  in  party  caucuses  and  conventions.1  With  the 
new  century  came  an  insistent  demand  for  reform  in  the  me- 
thod of  nominating  candidates  for  public  office.  This  demand 
for  reform  was  taken  up  by  the  press  of  the  state,  and  resulted 
in  the  submission  of  a  Public  Policy  question  to  the  people  at 
the  November  election  of  1904.  This  question  was  worded  as 
follows:  "Shall  the  State  Legislature  amend  the  Primary 
Election  Law  so  as  to  provide  for  party  primaries  at  which  the 
voter  will  vote  under  the  Australian  ballot  directly  for  the  can- 
didate whom  he  wishes  nominated  by  his  party." 

Upon  this  question  the  affirmative  vote  was  590,976  and  the 
negative  vote  78,446,  the  question  obtaining  a  distinct  majority 
of  the  total  vote  cast  at  the  election. 

In  his  message  of  January  4,  1905,  the  retiring  governor 
recommended  that  the  General  Assembly  enact  a  direct  primary 
law.  The  incoming  governor  in  his  inaugural  address  on  Janu- 
ary 9,  1905,  advocated  primary  legislation.  The  legislature  re- 
sponded to  public  sentiment  as  expressed  at  the  polls  and  to  the 
executive  recommendations  and  the  first  general  primary  law  was 
enacted  on  May  18,  1905.2  Before  there  was  an  opportunity  to 
put  this  law  into  effect  it  was  declared  invalid  by  the  Supreme 
Court.3  It  was  held  in  this  case  that  the  whole  law  was  objec- 
tionable because  it  was  local  and  special  legislation  since  it 
applied  different  rules  to  Cook  County  from  those  adopted  for 
the  remainder  of  the  state.  Certain  sections  of  the  law  were 
also  unconstitutional  on  other  grounds.  The  court  in  this  case 

iSee  Merriam,    C.  E.,  Primary  Elections,   1908,   298-302;    and  Illinois 
Laws,  1885,  187;  1889,  140;  1898,  11;  1899,  211;  1901,  172,  192;  1903,  176. 
2  Illinois  Laws,  1905,  211. 
s  People  v.  Board  of  Election  Commissioners,  211  111.,  9. 

43 


44  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [186 

laid  down  the  general  rule  that  primaries  were  elections  as  that 
term  is  used  in  the  constitution  and  consequently  all  the  con- 
stitutional provisions  applying  to  general  elections  were  also 
applicable  to  primaries.  "The  right  to  choose  candidates  for 
public  offices,  whose  names  will  be  placed  on  the  official  ballot, 
is  as  valuable  as  the  right  to  vote  for  them  after  they  are  chosen 
and  it  is  of  precisely  the  same  nature."  The  court  later  ad- 
hered to  this  rule  throughout  the  litigation  over  the  primary 
law,  though  the  application  of  the  rule  does  not  always  seem 
clear. 

Immediately  after  the  judicial  decision  declaring  invalid  the 
act  of  1905,  the  General  Assembly  was  convened  in  special  ses- 
sion for  the  purpose  of  passing  another  law.  The  second  gen- 
eral Primary  Election  Law  was  approved  May  23,  1906.*  Under 
this  act  a  state-wide  primary  election  was  held  in  August  and 
the  candidates  nominated  in  this  primary  were  voted  upon  in 
the  November  election  of  1906. 

This  primary  law  met  the  same  fate  as  its  predecessor  and 
was  declared  unconstitutional  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  October, 
1907.5  This  declaration  of  unconstitutionality,  however,  as  in- 
dicated above,  did  not  come  until  after  the  act  had  actually 
been  applied  to  nominations  for  the  regular  election  of  Novem- 
ber, 1906. 

One  of  the  grounds  for  holding  invalid  the  primary  act  of 
1906  directly  relates  to  the  subject  of  cumulative  voting.  The 
law  provided  that  delegates  to  a  senatorial  convention  should  be 
instructed  to  vote  on  the  first  ballot  for  the  candidate  for  re- 
presentative who  received  the  highest  popular  vote  at  the  pri- 
mary. One  candidate  was  thus  in  effect  entitled  to  nomination 
because  of  the  popular  vote  if  his  plurality  was  properly  dis- 
tributed so  that  he  received  the  instructed  vote  of  a  majority 
of  the  delegates  to  the  senatorial  convention.  If  he  failed  to 
receive  a  majority  then  the  instructions  were  discharged  and  the 
delegates  free  to  make  the  selection.  The  popular  vote  thus 
applied  but  to  one  of  the  three  candidates  for  representative, 
that  is,  to  the  candidate  for  representative  receiving  the  highest 
popular  vote  at  the  primary. 

*  Illinois  Laws,  1906,  Special  Session,  436. 
s  Rouse  v.  Thompson,  228  111.,  522. 


187]  PRIMARY  LEGISLATION  AND  ITS  EFFECT  45 

The  court  applied  its  previous  rule  regarding  the  consti- 
tutional status  of  primaries  and  held  that  since  the  constitution 
provided  that  a  voter  had  the  right  to  vote  for  one,  two  or  three 
candidates  for  representative  in  the  General  Assembly  at  the 
general  election  and  the  primary  law  provided  that  the  voter 
could  vote  for  but  one  candidate  that  portion  of  the  statute  was 
accordingly  unconstitutional.  In  the  opinion  it  was  stated  that : 
"Any  primary  election  law  to  be  valid,  which  provides  for  the 
nomination  of  candidates  for  representatives  in  the  General 
Assembly  must  give  the  voter  the  right  to  participate  in  the 
selection  of  all  the  candidates  of  his  party  for  representatives 
in  the  General  Assembly  which  are  to  be  nominated  by  his 
party."  Also  in  this  opinion  the  court  pointed  out  rather  de- 
finitely at  least  one  possible  method  by  which  a  primary  law 
could  be  applied  to  the  selection  of  candidates  for  the  office  of 
representative  so  as  to  conform  to  constitutional  provisions.  The 
method  proposed  by  the  court  however  did  not  seem  to  appeal  to 
the  legislature. 

A  third  primary  law  was  enacted  in  January,  1908,6  and  was 
declared  unconstitutional  in  June,  1909.7  As  happened  under 
the  primary  act  of  1906,  between  the  time  of  the  passing  of  the 
law  of  1908  and  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  holding  it 
unconstitutional,  a  primary  election  was  held  under  the  statute, 
and  nominees  thus  chosen  were  voted  upon  at  the  general  elec- 
tion held  in  November,  1908. 

The  decision  holding  the  primary  law  of  1908  invalid  was 
based  on  several  grounds,  one  of  which  relates  to  the  subject  of 
cumulative  voting.  The  court  held  quite  closely  to  its  rule, 
promulgated  in  the  first  primary  case  and  re-affirmed  in  the 
second  decision,  that  primaries  are  elections  as  that  term  is  used 
in  the  constitution  and  the  decision  is  primarily  an  application 
of  this  rule  as  the  court  interpreted  it.  It  was  held  that  all 
provisions  of  the  constitution,  including  those  regarding  cum- 
ulative voting  for  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
must  apply  to  the  primary  elections  as  they  do  to  general  elec- 
tions. Since  the  statute  failed  to  meet  all  these  requirements 
it  was  declared  to  be  unconstitutional.  Incidentally  it  might 

c  Illinois  Laws,  Adjourned  Session,  1908,  48. 
7  People  v.  Strassheim,  240  111.,  279. 


46  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION       [188 

be  noted  that  this  statute  repeated  in  substance  some  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  previous  law  which  had  been  declared  void  in  the 
preceding  case. 

The  General  Assembly  in  enacting  these  primary  laws  had  ap- 
parently proceeded  upon  the  assumption  that  a  primary  election 
is  not  an  election  as  that  term  is  used  in  the  constitution.  It 
was  also  contended  that  the  cumulative  vote  was  intended  to  be 
applied  to  contests  between  parties  rather  than  to  intra-party 
contests  and  that  the  cumulative  vote  was  introduced  into  the 
constitution  of  1870  primarily  for  the  purpose  of  equalizing 
representation  between  the  parties.  In  regard  to  the  difference 
of  opinion  concerning  the  definition  of  the  word  "election"  as 
used  in  the  constitution,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  judicial  de- 
cisions in  some  states  agree  with  the  apparent  assumptions  of 
the  legislature  while  in  others  they  agree  with  the  ruling  of  the 
supreme  court. 

The  fourth  primary  law  of  Illinois  was  enacted  in  March, 
1910,  and  was  sustained  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  December  of 
the  same  year.8 

The  primary  legislation  of  1910  was  embodied  in  two  laws, 
one  relating  to  the  selection  of  officers  in  general,  and  the  other 
confined  to  the  nomination  of  members  of  the  Senate  and  the 
House  of  Representatives  and  the  election  of  senatorial  commit- 
teemen.  The  law  relating  to  legislative  nominations  provides 
that  the  senatorial  committee  in  each  district  shall  determine 
the  number  of  candidates  which  its  party  shall  nominate.  The 
act  also  expressly  provides  for  cumulative  voting  in  the  nomi- 
nation of  party  candidates  for  the  House  of  Representatives, 
specifying  that  "in  all  primaries  for  the  nomination  of  candi- 
dates for  representatives  in  the  General  Assembly,  each  quali- 
fied primary  elector  may  cast  three  votes  for  one  candidate,  or 
may  distribute  the  same  or  any  parts  thereof  among  two  candi- 
dates or  three  candidates  as  he  shall  see  fit." 

The  primary  law  of  1910  provides  that  any  citizen  legally 
qualified  to  fill  the  office  of  representative  may  become  a  candi- 
date in  the  party  primary  and  have  his  name  printed  upon  the 
ballot,  by  filing  a  petition  signed  by  one-half  of  one  per  cent 

8  People  v.  Deneen,  247  111.,  289. 


189]  PRIMARY  LEGISLATION  AND  ITS  EFFECT  47 

of  the  qualified  primary  electors  of  the  party  in  his  district.9 
Because  of  the  ease  with  which  one  may  become  a  candidate  in 
the  party  primary,  there  has  been  no  dearth  of  such  candidates. 
In  1910  there  were  722  candidates; 10  in  1912,  604;  in  1914,  693 ; 
in  1916,  592 ;  and  in  1918,  456.  These  figures  are  for  the  can- 
didates of  all  parties,  and  in  connection  with  them  it  should  be 
borne  in  mind  that  the  number  of  places  to  be  filled  at  each 
regular  election  is  153. 

The  great  number  of  candidates  in  1910  was  probably  due 
not  only  to  the  tendency  to  experiment  with  a  new  plan,  but 
also  to  the  high  degree  of  public  interest  because  of  the  scan- 
dal incident  to  the  election  of  United  States  Senator  at  the 
session  of  1909.  The  large  number  of  candidates  in  1914  was 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  Progressive  party  first  appeared  in  the 
primary  of  that  year,  and  had  in  the  1912  general  election  ob- 
tained a  fairly  large  number  of  seats  in  the  General  Assembly, 
although  in  that  election  the  Progressive  party  nominees  were 
not  selected  by  popular  vote  at  the  primary.  No  less  than  126 
Progressive  candidates  appeared  in  1914. 

Under  the  primary  election  law  of  1910  the  fight  for  office 
is  now  divided  into  two  contests,  and  the  number  of  candidates 
in  the  first  or  primary  contest  is  an  index  of  the  freedom  of 
choice  presented  to  the  voters.  A  table  is  therefore  given  cov- 
ering a  period  of  five  elections  under  the  law  of  1910,  showing 
by  districts  the  number  of  candidates  and  nominees  of  the  im- 
portant parties  at  these  elections. 

In  twenty-two  instances  out  of  561  the  voter  had  no  choice, 
there  being  but  one  candidate  presented  fo'r  nomination.  Nine 
of  these  twenty-two  cases  were  those  of  candidates  of  the  Pro- 
gressive party  in  1914,  when  that  party  was  concentrating  upon 
comparatively  few  candidates.  In  1910,  1912,  and  1914  the 
greatest  number  of  candidates  appeared  in  the  Democratic  pri- 
maries, while  in  1916  and  1918  the  greatest  number  appeared  in 
the  Republican  primaries. 

»  The  statute  also  contemplates  independent  candidates  appearing  on  the 
regular  election  ticket  by  petition. 

10  Unofficial  figures.  The  statistics  given  in  Table  V  include  four  parties 
only  for  1910.  In  addition  to  the  candidates  of  these  four  parties  there 
were  a  considerable  number  of  independent  candidates. 


48  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION       [190 


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50  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [192 

The  average  number  of  primary  candidates  of  the  two  great 
parties  over  the  period  of  five  elections  was  four  to  the  district. 
All  the  cases  in  which  there  were  ten  or  more  candidates  to  the 
district  were  within  Cook  County.  In  the  fourth  and  nine- 
teenth districts  in  1914  there  were  20  and  22  primary  candidates 
respectively  for  the  Democratic  nominations,  while  the  largest 
number  entered  in  a  Republican  primary  was  12  in  the  21st 
and  31st  districts  in  1916. 

The  large  number  of  contestants  in  party  primaries  in  cer- 
tain cases  may  be  partly  due  to  factional  warfare  within  the 
party  and  to  lack  of  strong  party  candidates.  The  party  organ- 
ization can  still  put  up  its  own  candidates  and  still  does  so,  but 
the  primary  law  has  undoubtedly  thrown  open  the  doors  to  as 
many  non-organization  candidates  as  may  be  desired.  Although 
candidates  without  an  organization  support  may  present  them- 
selves with  great  ease  for  the  party  nominations  in  the  primary, 
it  should,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that  party  organization 
is  effective  here  as  well  as  in  the  general  election,  and  that  ordin- 
arily the  primary  candidate  with  organization  aid  obtains  the 
nomination. 

As  has  already  been  mentioned,  the  primary  act  of  1910  pro- 
vides for  a  senatorial  committee  of  each  party  in  every  district. 
This  committee  is  composed  of  three  members  for  each  district 
consisting  of  two  counties  or  less ;  and  of  one  member  from  each 
county  in  districts  of  three  or  more  counties.  In  two-county 
districts  the  respective  counties  select  one  or  two  members  ac- 
cording to  the  vote  polled  at  the  previous  general  election,  and  in 
one-county  districts  or  districts  wholly  within  a  county,  the  mem- 
bers are  elected  at  large. 

The  principal  function  of  the  senatorial  committee  of  each 
party  is  to  determine  how  many  candidates  of  that  party  shall 
be  nominated  within  the  district.  "When  the  primary  legisla- 
tion was  under  consideration  an  attempt  was  made  to  allow 
the  voters  to  decide  for  themselves  whether  each  party  should 
nominate  one,  two  or  three  candidates  for  representative.  It 
was  decided,  however,  that  this  power  should  be  given  to  the 
senatorial  committee,  and  this  decision  was  made  largely  be- 
cause of  the  fact  that  it  would  have  been  extremely  difficult  to 
devise  a  system  under  which  the  voter  could  at  the  same  time 


193]  PRIMARY  LEGISLATION  AND  ITS  EFFECT  51 

express  his  view  as  to  the  number  to  be  nominated  by  his*party, 
and  also  indicate  his  preference  among  candidates  the  number  of 
which  had  not  then  been  determined. 

The  number  of  candidates  to  be  nominated  by  a  party  must 
be  decided  by  the  senatorial  committee  at  least  thirty-three  days 
prior  to  the  primary  election.  The  committee,  of  course,  deter- 
mines merely  how  many  candidates  are  to  be  nominated.  It 
can  decide  how  many  nominees  the  district  is  to  have,  but  it  can- 
not legally  dictate  what  candidates  are  to  be  chosen  by  the 
voters.  The  members  are  elected  by  popular  vote  at  the  primary, 
and  the  voters  have  an  opportunity  to  select  non-organization 
committeemen  though  they  may  not  take  advantage  of  the  oppor- 
tunity. The  senatorial  committee  has  undoubtedly  been  an  im- 
portant part  of  the  party  machinery  and  in  practice  has,  to  a 
large  extent,  apparently  been  able  to  determine  who  the  nomi- 
nee or  nominees  shall  be. 

A  study  of  Table  IV  will  show  that  in  the  general  elec- 
tions since  the  primary  law  came  into  force  there  have  been 
but  ten  instances  in  which  one  party  has  nominated  more 
than  two  candidates,  although  the  number  of  party  nominees 
has  been  slightly  greater  than  before  the  adoption  of  the 
primary  law.  The  total  number  of  nominees  put  forth  from 
year  to  year  by  either  of  the  two  leading  parties  shows  no  great 
variation.  The  senatorial  committee's  ability  to  forecast  party 
strength  has  on  the  whole  proven  good.  In  the  five  elections 
held  since  the  primary  law  has  been  operative,  in  but  twelve 
instances  have  party  candidates  failed  in  the  general  election 
because  the  senatorial  committee  permitted  too  many  candidates 
to  enter  the  final  contest.  Eight  of  these  cases  occurred  in  1912, 
and  were  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Progressives,  a  new  party, 
entered  the  field  and  it  was  impossible  to  forecast  accurately 
its  strength.  It  should  also  be  stated  that  minor  parties  al- 
most invariably  limit  their  candidates  at  the  primaries  to  one 
for  each  district,  restricting  their  voters  both  in  the  primary 
and  in  the  general  election  to  but  one  candidate.  This,  how- 
ever, was  not  true  of  the  Progressive  party  in  1914. 

Table  V  indicates  the  party  vote  cast  at  the  last  five  primary 
elections.  The  meagerness  of  this  vote  confirms  the  general 
opinion  with  regard  to  primary  elections,  namely,  that  they  do 


52  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [194 

not  aifouse  the  interest  of  the  average  voter.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  in  1916,  95  votes  were  sufficient  to  nominate  thir- 
teen candidates  of  the  Progressive  party. 

The  primary  system  has  given  a  greater  opportunity  to  those 
who  desire  to  become  candidates  for  party  nominations,  and  has 
theoretically  given  to  each  voter  a  greater  share  in  the 
determination  as  to  who  the  party  candidates  shall  be.  How- 
ever as  already  suggested,  the  party  organization  still  deter- 
mines as  a  usual  thing  who  the  nominees  shall  be.  In  practice 
a  well  disciplined  party  organization  is  more  effective  than  a 
loosely  organized  independent  or  reform  movement.  It  should 
be  noted  however  that  the  primary  system  does  force  a  presenta- 
tion of  the  organization  candidates  more  openly  than  was  the 
case  before  the  introduction  of  the  primary. 

With  two  elections,  the  one  a  choice  between  candidates  at 
the  primary  and  the  other  between  nominees  at  the  general  elec- 
tion, the  real  determination  as  to  the  membership  of  the  General 
Assembly  has  shifted  largely  to  the  first  or  primary  election. 
This  has  not  materially  altered  the  situation,  for  before  the  pri- 
mary law  was  enacted  the  real  determination  as  to  who  should 
be  members  of  the  General  Assembly  was  not  altogether  that 
at  the  general  election,  but  was,  to  a  very  considerable  extent, 
a  determination  within  the  party  organization  before  the  general 
election  was  held.  Under  the  system  which  existed  before  the  in- 
troduction of  the  primary,  the  voter  at  the  general  election  had 
little  choice  as  to  whom  he  should  cast  his  ballot  for,  and  the 
existing  primary  law  has  not  greatly  changed  this,  although 
since  the  enactment  of  that  law  the  voters  have  had  a  some- 
what greater  choice  through  the  fact  that  there  have  been  more 
four-candidate  districts  than  previously. 

If  an  organization  candidate  is  to  be  defeated,  however,  the 
contest  must  be  made  in  the  primary,  and  it  is  probable  that  the 
non-organization  voters  have  a  more  distinct  opportunity  to  de- 
feat an  undesirable  organization  candidate  under  the  primary 
system  than  before.  But  it  can  scarcely  be  said  that  the  present 
primary  system  has  weakened  party  organization. 

The  primary  system  does,  however,  make  it  possible  to  or- 
gazine  and  carry  on  an  open  fight  against  an  undesirable 
candidate  for  the  nomination.  The  existence  of  this  oppor- 


195] 


PRIMARY  LEGISLATION  AND  ITS  EFFECT 


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54  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION       [196 

tunity  has  led  such  associations  as  the  Legislative  Voters' 
League  to  transfer  their  activities,  to  a  very  large  extent,  to 
the  primaries  as  distinguished  from  the  general  election.  The 
Legislative  Voters'  League,  since  the  adoption  of  the  primary 
system,  has  issued  recommendations  regarding  candidates  be- 
fore the  primaries,  recognizing  the  fact  that  the  voters'  choice 
after  such  primaries  is  relatively  limited.  However,  as  has  al- 
ready been  suggested,  the  voter  has  a  limited  degree  of  choice 
in  the  fairly  large  number  of  districts  where  each  of  the  leading 
parties  nominates  two  candidates  to  be  voted  upon  at  the  gen- 
eral election. 


CHAPTER  V 
EFFECT  ON  PARTY  ORGANIZATION 

An  investigation  of  the  practical  workings  of  cumulative 
voting  is  difficult,  since  with  the  exception  of  the  bare  facts 
to  be  derived  from  official  statistics,  there  is  little  information 
on  the  subject.  The  history  of  the  scheme  is  contemporaneous 
history  and  it  is  not  easy  to  determine  what  has  been  accomp- 
lished by  a  movement  still  in  progress.  Many  of  the  facts 
must  be  sought  from  individuals  still  in  active  life  and  in  order 
to  supplement  statistical  information,  a  list  of  questions  was 
sent  in  1908  when  the  first  edition  of  this  study  was  in  prepara- 
tion to  members  of  the  legislature,1  state  officials,  editors 
of  some  of  the  more  important  newspapers  of  the  state,  indiv- 
viduals  active  in  civic  reforms  and  a  few  other  prominent  citi- 
zens. The  tabulation  of  the  answers  to  those  questions  still 
of  interest  will  appear  in  this  and  following  chapters. 

In  a  preceding  chapter  appears  the  following  quotation 
from  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  Electoral  Reform  to  the 
constitutional  convention : 

"It  (minority  representation)  will  also  tend  powerfully  to  re- 
lieve the  voter  from  the  despotism  of  party  caucuses  and  at  the 
same  time  constrain  leaders  to  exercise  more  care  in  selecting 
candidates  for  law-making.  There  is  nothing  which  will  more 
effectually  put  an  end  to  the  practice  of  packing  conventions 
than  arming  the  voter  with  the  three-shooter  or  triple  ballot 
power,  whereby  he  may  fire  'plumpers'  for  the  candidate  of 
his  choice  and  against  those  of  his  aversion."  In  other  words, 
the  cumulative  vote  would  deal  a  death  blow  to  party  bossism. 
In  a  report  issued  by  the  Legislative  Voters '  League  of  Chicago 
appear  these  statements:  "By  it  (minority  representation)  the 
people  of  Illinois  have  lost  control  of  their  Legislature,"  and 
"Minority  representation  has  been  one  of  the  most  vicious  acts 

i  Legislature  of  1908. 

55 


56  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION       [198 

ever  placed  on  the  statute  books;"  "The  candidates  nominated 
and  elected  under  the  present  system  are  in  most  instances 
merely  errand  boys  and  messengers  for  the  party  boss. ' ' 2 

It  would  be  difficult  for  two  assertions  to  be  more  widely  con- 
tradictory. One  is  the  statement  made  by  a  civic  reformer  proph- 
eseying  the  results  of  one  of  his  favorite  projects,  the  other 
was  made  after  the  scheme  had  been  tried  for  thirty-five  years. 
While  the  first,  being  a  prophecy,  can  prove  nothing,  neither 
do  the  latter  empiric  dogmatic  statements  convince. 

One  of  the  questions  contained  in  the  letter  of  inquiry  sent 
out  in  1908  was,  "Does  the  system  (cumulative  voting)  in- 
crease or  dimmish  the  power  of  the  party  machine?"  Eighty- 
four  definite  answers  were  received  to  this  question.  Nine  as- 
serted that  the  power  was  diminished,  thirty-five  maintained 
that  the  system  had  no  effect  on  party  organization,  while  forty 
asserted,  and  most  of  these  were  very  certain  as  to  the  correct- 
ness of  the  answer,  that  the  influence  of  the  party  machine  was 
greatly  increased.  It  is  interesting,  if  not  important,  to  note 
that  of  the  nine  who  thought  the  party  power  was  diminished, 
seven  were  then  members  of  the  legislature,  and  in  general  there 
is  considerable  variation  between  the  answers  of  politicians  and 
others  who  are  but  observers  or  critics  of  political  affairs. 

One  strong  evidence  of  strict  party  control  was  the  limited 
number  of  real  candidates  nominated  under  the  convention  sys- 
tem especially  in  the  Chicago  districts.  It  is  true  that  there 
were  frequently  seven  or  eight  candidates  for  the  three  places 
at  each  election,  but  usually  there  were  but  three  nominees  of 
the  two  dominant  parties  combined,  and  nomination  thus  be- 
came practically  equivalent  to  an  election.  Other  candidates 
represented  various  minor  parties  and  were  fully  aware  that 
ordinarily  they  had  no  chance  of  election.  The  usual  rule  was 
for  the  majority  party  to  nominate  two,  the  principal  minority 
one,  and  this  custom  was  practically  universal  so  far  as  the 
former  party  was  concerned.  Prior  to  1896  three  candidates 

2  But  compare  the  following  from  the  reports  of  this  same  organization : 
' '  The  things  which  have  distinguished  this  Legislature  are  the  high  char- 
acter of  a  majority  of  its  members.  .  . "  "  We  are  prepared  to  state 
that  it  is  an  absolute  fact  that  a  large  majority  of  the  members  of  the  44th 
General  Assembly  are  honest  and  patriotic  citizens"  and  various  kindred 
statements. 


199]  EFFECT  ON  PARTY  ORGANIZATION  57 

were  occasionally  nominated  by  one  party,  but  this  happened 
only  in  districts  where  the  majority  party  was  unusually  strong 
and  had  some  hopes  of  electing  three  members ;  or,  what  was  more 
usual,  the  three  candidates  were  the  result  of  county  factional 
controversies  where  two  or  more  counties  were  combined  in  one 
district.  In  such  cases  it  sometimes  happened  that  the  larger 
county  demanded  and  secured  both  nominees  and  the  smaller 
county,  for  the  sake  of  revenge,  would  adopt  the  suicidal  policy 
of  putting  a  candidate  of  its  own  in  the  field.  So  far  as  has 
been  ascertained,  no  majority  party  has  ever  nominated  three 
candidates  in  order  to  give  its  constituents  a  greater  choice  at 
the  polls. 

Before  1910  the  number  of  candidates  to  be  nominated  was 
determined  by  the  party  leaders.  No  more  candidates  were 
nominated  than  it  was  thought  possible  to  elect,  and  nomina- 
tions were  made  in  party  caucuses  and  conventions.  Since 
1910  the  law  has  expressly  vested  in  the  senatorial  committee 
of  each  political  party  the  power  "to  determine  the  number  of 
candidates  to  be  nominated  by  their  party  at  the  primary  for 
representative  in  the  General  Assembly ; ' '  and  the  nomination  is 
made  at  a  primary  election,  in  which  each  voter  may  cumulate 
his  votes  the  same  as  at  a  general  election. 

In  Cook  County,  which  has  nineteen  districts  and  conse- 
quently fifty-seven  Eepresentatives  to  elect,  there  were  before 
1910  from  59  to  61  candidates  presented  by  the  combined  Re- 
publican and  Democratic  parties.  Since  1910  there  have  been 
from  62  to  67  presented.  It  was  the  rule  to  have  but  three  can- 
didates presented  by  the  two  main  political  parties  before  the 
primary  law  of  1910,  but  since  that  year  42  percent  of  the  Cook 
County  districts  have  had  four  or  more  nominees.  In  at  least 
one  district  both  in  1904  and  1906  the  majority  party  was 
strong  enough  to  elect  all  three  representatives  but  presented 
only  two  candidates.3  In  the  districts  outside  of  Cook  County 
the  appearance  of  four  candidates  of  the  two  great  parties  has 
been  more  common  since  1910  than  in  Cook  County. 

In  ten  of  the  thirty-two  districts  outside  of  Cook  County  in 
1906,  the  two  dominant  parties  nominated  four  candidates  for 
the  three  positions.  In  1904  in  the  same  districts  four  candi- 

3  Seventh    District. 


58  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION       [200 

dates  were  nominated  in  but  eight  of  them;  in  1902  four  can- 
didates were  nominated  in  but  seven  districts.  In  1900,  under 
the  apportionment  of  1893  in  which  there  were  36  districts  out- 
side of  Cook  County,  20  districts  had  four  or  more  candidates 
of  the  two  main  parties  in  the  field;  in  1898,  26  districts  and 
in  1896,  20  districts;  in  1894,  29  districts.  Under  the  primary 
law  of  1910  there  has  been  an  increased  number  of  four-nomi- 
nee districts  outside  of  Cook  County ;  in  1910  there  were  17  out 
of  the  32  districts ;  in  1912,  15 ;  in  1914,  15 ;  in  1916,  13 ;  and  in 
1918,  17  districts. 

It  appears  from  the  above  figures  that  the  voters  of  the  mi- 
nority party  in  certain  districts  have  had  a  limited  choice  of 
candidates  at  the  election.  It  will  also  be  seen  that  there  is 
no  uniform  rule  governing  the  action  of  the  minority  in  regard 
to  nominating  two  candidates,  but  there  was  a  decrease  in  the 
number  of  four  candidate  districts  in  the  elections  preceding 
1910  and  an  increase  of  such  districts  since  that  year.4 

Whether  this  is  merely  accidental  or  whether  it  is  a  permanent 
tendency  cannot  be  definitely  determined.  Whenever  there  are 
two  candidates  on  the  same  ticket  and  but  one  can  be  elected 
there  is  obviousty  an  excellent  prospect  for  an  intra-party 
fight. 

A  study  of  election  statistics  reveals  little  or  nothing  regard- 
ing party  discipline.  In  some  districts  where  there  are  four  can- 
didates and  naturally  each  nominee  of  the  minority  party  will 
induce  as  much  "plumping"  for  himself  as  possible,  the  equal- 
ity of  the  vote  would  seem  to  indicate  an  obedience  to  the  party 
exhortation  not  to  "plump,"  but  to  vote  one  and  one-half  votes 
for  each  candidate.  In  other  cases  "plumping"  does  appear, 
but  it  is  impossible  to  tell  whether  this  is  due  to  a  voters'  re- 
bellion against  party  domination  or  whether  it  is  an  indication 
of  the  power  of  the  party  leaders  using  their  influence  to  elect  the 
organization  candidate. 

Such  a  scheme  as  minority  representation  and  cumulative  vot- 
ing must  automatically  increase  party  control.  Several  thous- 
and voters  coming  to  the  polls  each  with  three  votes  to  distribute 
as  he  sees  fit,  without  a  certain  amount  of  party  supervision, 
can  lead  to  nothing  but  confusion,  injustice,  and  misrepresen- 

*  See  Table  IV  for  1910  and  following  elections. 


201]  EFFECT  ON  PARTY  ORGANIZATION  59 

tation.  Some  popular  candidate  might  receive  a  large  share  of 
the  votes  while  two  others,  a  majority  of  those  to  be  elected  in 
this  case,  might  be  selected  by  a  comparatively  few  votes  cast 
for  each.  There  would  inevitably  be  such  a  waste  of  votes  and 
unfair  representation  that  the  people  would  demand,  or  at  least 
acquiesce  in,  the  dictation  of  party  managers  in  order  to  pre- 
vent such  useless  and  indiscriminate  voting. 

The  undesirable  conditions  described  above  are  not  a  mere 
supposition  of  what  might  happen,  but  specific  instances  can 
be  cited  of  the  disaster  attending  cumulative  voting  elections 
without  party  organization  among  the  mass  of  the  people.  The 
best  illustrations  are  the  somewhat  notorious  school  board  elec- 
tions in  England  in  1870  already  mentioned,  when  in  some  of 
the  districts  as  many  as  fifteen  members  were  to  be  elected  and 
each  elector  as  in  Illinois,  had  as  many  votes  as  there  were 
places  to  be  filled.  In  Manchester  there  were  fifteen  members  to 
be  elected.  "Manchester  is  famous  for  two  things  —  first,  the 
fervor  of  its  Protestanism ;  second,  the  number,  organization  and 
strength  of  its  working  classes.  But  at  this  election  two  Roman 
Catholics  were  brought  in  at  the  head  of  the  poll,  one  of  them 
receiving  nearly  20,000  more  votes  than  any  Protestant  candi- 
date and  no  working  class  candidate,  of  whom  there  were  seven, 
being  elected  at  all. ' ' 5 

In  Marylebone,  a  district  of  London,  the  favorite  candidate 
received  47,858  votes  and  the  next  in  the  list  had  only  13,494. 
In  Finsbury,  another  district  of  London,  the  highest  number 
received  by  one  candidate  was  27,858  and  the  next  highest  but 
10,766.  In  Birmingham  the  fifteen  successful  candidates  were 
voted  for  by  about  18,800  voters,  while  10,100  lost  their  votes 
on  unsuccessful  candidates 6 —  a  much  greater  percentage  of  non- 
representation  than  usually  prevails  in  the  single  vote  method. 
If  specific  instances  are  necessary  to  prove  what  appears  an 
almost  axiomatic  truth  —  the  futility  of  attempting  an  election 
with  the  cumulative  vote  without  party  organization  and  lead- 
ers able  to  control  that  organization,  the  English  school  board 
elections  furnish  some  very  instructive  examples. 

While  there  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  a  scheme  of  cumulative 

s  Butcher,  Minority  Representation,  72. 
6  Dutcher,  Minority  Representation,  69-74. 


60  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [202 

voting,  because  of  inherent  peculiarities,  will  create  a  demand 
for  a  strong  party  organization,  this  does  not  necessarily  imply 
that  the  members  of  the  various  legislatures  of  the  state  have 
been  ' '  machine ' '  men  in  the  opprobious  sense  in  which  that  term 
has  come  to  be  used.  However,  legislative  conditions  in  Illi- 
nois have  not  been  altogether  satisfactory,  to  put  it  mildly,  and 
the  records  of  some  of  the  legislatures  have  not  been  ideal. 
Granting,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  all  the  many  accusa- 
tions made  against  the  legislature  in  the  past  few  years  are 
true,  it  would  appear  that  the  cumulative  voting  system  has 
been  more  sinned  against  than  sinning.  Admitting  all  the 
charges,  there  is  no  evidence  anywhere  nor  any  analogy  from 
which  conclusions  can  be  drawn  which  would  warrant  any  be- 
lief other  than  that  the  ' '  machine ' '  would  be  just  as  corrupt  and 
have  just  as  complete  control  as  it  now  has  if  the  cumulative 
vote  had  never  been  used.  An  investigation  of  the  legislatures 
of  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  in  fact  almost  any  state  selected  at 
random,  will  show  that  other  states  suffer  from  exactly  the  same 
political  "boss"  evils  of  which  Illinois  complains.  The  sins  of 
the  latter  state's  legislature  seem  to  be  those  of  omission  rather 
than  commission.  There  have  been  vexatious  delays  in  securing 
legislation  made  necessary  by  the  rapid  advance  of  the  state, 
but  with  a  few  recent  exceptions  there  have  not  been  many 
charges  of  positive  corruption  such  as  are  not  altogether  in- 
frequent in  other  states. 

The  same  organization  which  calls  the  cumulative  voting  sys- 
tem the  "most  vicious  piece  of  legislation  ever  placed  on  the 
statute  books"  also  says:  "These  two  measures  illustrate  how 
the  organizations  of  the  Senate  and  House  work  hand  in  hand. 
They  divide  the  responsibility  —  one  kills  one  bill  and  the  other 
another. "  7  In  other  words,  the  Senate  is  as  bad  as  the  House, 
yet  the  Senate  has  never  been  tainted  with  the  cumulative  vote. 
Also  in  this  state  there  was  no  cumulative  voting  prior  to  1872, 
and  surely  the  records  of  some  of  these  earlier  legislatures  are 
nothing  of  which  to  boast.  So  greatly  did  the  early  law-making 
bodies  abuse  their  power  that  one  of  the  principal  reasons  for 
calling  a  constitutional  convention  in  1848  and  again  in  1862 

T  Legislative  Voters'  League,  Preliminary  Report  on  the  45th  General 
Assembly,  1908. 


203]  EFFECT  ON  PARTY  ORGANIZATION  61 

was  to  limit  legislative  discretion.  It  is  not  necessary  here  to 
describe  the  "internal  improvement"  policy,  the  oppressive 
state  debt,  attempts  at  repudiation,  the  passage  of  questionable 
private  bills  and  the  long,  dreary  list  of  legislative  shortcomings, 
but  it  is  doubtful  if  the  later  legislatures  can  equal  the  unen- 
viable records  of  many  of  their  early  predecessors. 

The  above  is  written  with  no  intention  of  either  defending  or 
condemning  the  state  legislatures,  but  rather  to  clear  the  cumu- 
lative voting  system  of  certain  charges  of  which  it  is  not  al- 
together guilty.  It  would  be  useless  to  deny  that  the  cumula- 
tive vote  requires  strict  party  discipline,  and  that  in  this  sys- 
tem the  political  "boss"  found  ready  made  a  means  of  exercis- 
ing his  control,  but  all  evidence  tends  to  show  that  if  such  means 
had  not  been  furnished  he  would  have  found  methods  of 
his  own  to  accomplish  the  same  result.  It  is,  of  course,  a  very 
negative  sort  of  a  recommendation  to  say  that  a  system  is  no 
worse  than  others  but,  so  far  as  the  evils  of  excessive  party 
control  is  concerned,  that  is  the  most  that  can  be  said  about  the 
cumulative  system  as  actually  applied  in  this  state.  But  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  these  evils  are  not  all  due  to  cumu- 
lative voting  per  se,  but  rather  to  abuses  of  the  system,  and  here 
is  really  the  heart  of  the  whole  question.  As  the  scheme  has 
worked  out  in  practice  nominations  to  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives have  become  practically  equivalent  to  election. 

As  has  already  been  indicated,  the  primary  election  law  of 
1910  vested  in  the  party  senatorial  committee  of  each  district 
the  authority  to  determine  the  number  of  candidates  to  be  nomi- 
nated by  the  party  in  such  district.  The  preceding  discussion 
indicates  that  there  has  been  under  the  primary  law  a  greater 
number  of  cases  than  theretofore  in  which  each  of  the  larger 
parties  has  nominated  two  candidates.  The  determination  as 
to  how  many  candidates  each  party  shall  nominate  is  by  the 
terms  of  the  law  a  more  open  and  public  matter  than  before 
1910,  and  under  the  present  plan  party  leaders  have  so  acted 
as  to  give  the  voter  a  greater  degree  of  choice  in  the  general 
election. 

In  the  primary  to  nominate  the  number  of  candidates  desig- 
nated by  the  senatorial  committee,  the  cumulative  system  ap- 
plies, and  this  is  constitutionally  necessary  under  the  decisions 


62  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION       [204 

of  the  state  Supreme  Court.  The  tables  on  pages  48,  49  and  53 
indicate  that  there  has  been  no  dearth  of  primary  candidates  since 
1910.  Anyone  may  easily  become  a  candidate  in  the  primary,  but 
this  fact  does  not  seem  up  to  the  present  time  to  have  weakened 
the  party  organization.  The  application  of  the  cumulative  system 
to  the  primary  may  work  to  strengthen  the  organization,  for 
if  there  are  a  number  of  candidates  in  the  primary,  a  well  dis- 
ciplined body  of  voters  by  cumulating  on  one  or  two  candidates 
may  usually  decide  the  nomination;  and  the  party  organization 
has  thus  controlled  not  only  the  number  of  candidates  to  be 
nominated,  but  has  also  frequently  determined  who  should  be 
nominated  in  the  primary. 


CHAPTER  VI 

PRACTICAL    DIFFICULTIES    OF    THE    CUMULATIVE 
SYSTEM,  AND  ITS  EFFECT  ON  THE  LEGIS- 
LATIVE PERSONNEL 

When  the  advocates  of  electoral  reform  were  busy  formulat- 
ing schemes  of  minority  representation  they  had  no  difficulties 
in  devising  theories  that  would  afford  such  representation  with 
mathematical  exactness.  The  real  difficulty  lay  in  making  these 
methods  so  simple  that  the  ordinary  voter  could  exercise  his 
privilege  intelligently  and  the  returning  boards  tabulate  results 
readily  and  accurately.  The  committee  on  electoral  reform 
in  the  constitutional  convention  also  struggled  with  this  prob- 
lem and  abandoned  their  first  device  as  too  complicated.  The 
plan  finally  recommended  was  the  simplest  the  committee  could 
devise,  but  even  then  it  was  feared  there  would  be  difficulty  in 
voting  and  counting  the  votes.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  as  often 
happens  whenever  any  new  system  of  voting  is  put  into  opera- 
tion, there  was  at  first  some  difficulty  at  the  polls,  but  this  grew 
less  as  the  voters  became  familiar  with  the  plan.  Later,  when 
the  Australian  ballot  was  introduced,  more  obstacles  were  en- 
countered. To  obtain  additional  information  on  this  subject 
the  following  question  was  included  in  the  list  sent  out  by  the 
writer  in  1908 :  Are  there  any  practical  difficulties  in  voting, 
counting  votes,  etc?"  Of  the  ninety-three  answers  received  to 
this  question,  sixty  asserted  that  there  were  no  difficulties  at 
all,  or,  if  any,  they  were  so  slight  as  to  be  of  no  real  importance. 
Thirty-three  answered  that  the  difficulties  were  serious  enough 
to  constitute  a  real  objection.  In  the  great  majority  of  cases 
these  thirty-three  were  opposed  to  the  entire  plan,  and  were  in- 
clined to  attack  every  phase  of  it  whether  there  was  really  justi- 
fication for  such  attack  Or  not.  To  count  and  record  half  votes 
may  require  a  little  more  time  to  arrive  at  results  than  under 
the  ordinary  system  of  voting,  but  beyond  this  inconvenience  the 
practical  difficulties  are  so  slight  that  they  cannot  be  considered 
as  any  real  objection. 

63 


64  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [206 

With  the  idea  of  determining  public  sentiment  on  the  ques- 
tion and  to  ascertain  if  minority  representation  in  its  some- 
what crude  and  limited  form  was  regarded  sufficiently  success- 
ful that  the  people  of  the  state  would  approve  of  a  wider  ap- 
plication of  the  principle,  a  question  was  included  in  the  pre- 
viously mentioned  list  sent  out  in  1908  asking  what  advantages, 
if  any,  would  be  gained  by  increasing  the  size  of  the  districts 
and  electing  more  than  three  men  from  each.  Evidently  the 
larger  the  districts  and  the  more  officials  elected  from  each,  the 
more  opportunity  small  parties  would  have  of  being  represent- 
ed and  the  more  nearly  the  scheme  would  approach  proportional 
representation.  Of  eighty-eight  who  replied  directly  to  this 
question,  three  favored  the  idea  of  larger  districts  and  eighty- 
five  disapproved,  but  it  is  evident  that  the  answers  are  of  but 
little  value  so  far  as  an  expression  of  opinion  regarding  propor- 
tional representation  is  concerned.  Apparently  those  replying 
had  not  considered  the  wide  extension  of  the  principles  of  pro- 
portional representation  which  such  a  change  would  entail  and 
opposed  any  such  increase  in  the  size  of  the  districts  on  grounds 
of  general  expediency. 

Judging  from  the  opinions  of  representative  citizens  whose 
standing  in  the  community  is  such  that  their  ideas  may  be  taken 
as  a  criterion,  public  sentiment  is  either  indifferent  or  opposed 
to  minority  representation.  The  scheme  has  a  few  warm 
friends,  but  many  of  those  expressing  opinions  think  it  has  pro- 
duced but  little  effect  in  any  direction,  while  others  are  squarely 
opposed,  opposition  usually  being  based  on  the  alleged  subver- 
sion of  the  system  by  party  organization.  All  are  agreed  that 
one  of  the  principal  objects  of  the  introduction  of  the  method, 
the  allaying  of  sectional  strife,  has  been  accomplished,  but  this 
is  now  an  issue  of  the  past  and  cannot  be  advanced  as  a  justi- 
fication for  the  present  existence  of  minority  representation. 

As  quoted  in  a  preceding  chapter  the  electoral  committee 
took  the  view  that:  "It  (cumulative  voting)  will  increase  the 
usefulness  of  the  legislature  by  improving  the  membership.  It 
will  enable  virtuous  citizens  to  elect  the  ablest  and  purest  men 
in  their  midst  and  secure  to  the  legislative  councils  a  large 
measure  of  popular  confidence  and  respect. ' '  How  far  this  con- 
tention has  been  justified  it  is  difficult  to  say,  but  in  reply  to 


207]      DIFFICULTIES  AND  EFFECT  ON  LEGISLATIVE  PERSONNEL  65 

the  previously  mentioned  questionnaire  sent  out  in  1908,  only 
six  out  of  a  total  of  eighty-four  who  expressed  their  ideas  on 
the  subject  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  personnel  of  the  legis- 
lature had  been  improved  by  the  cumulative  method  of  election. 
The  public,  however,  usually  thinks  of  cases  in  which  the  cumu- 
lative system  has  kept  in  office  some  undesirable  member,  and 
overlooks  the  fact  that  a  number  of  the  ablest  and  most  useful 
members  have  been  minority  members  in  their  own  districts. 

Those  mentioned  above  who  expressed  their  opinions  on  this 
subject  are  not  altogether  fair  in  their  comparisons  between  the 
cumulative  vote  and  the  ordinary  method.  They  are  fully 
aware  of  the  defects  of  the  method  used  and  compare  an  actual 
system  and  its  practical  evils  with  an  ideal  conception  of  the 
one-vote  method,  forgetting  that  the  latter  leads  to  equally  bad, 
if  not  the  same,  evils,  when  put  into  operation.  Then  again, 
it  is  the  fashion  to  decry  and  ridicule  all  legislative  bodies  from 
municipal  councils  to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  Crea- 
tive legislation  is  a  difficult  task  and  when  mistakes  are  made 
many  self-constituted  critics  appear  and  denounce  both  statutes 
and  their  authors  and  allowance  must  be  made  for  this  prevail- 
ing custom. 

There  are  two  features,  aside  from  the  increased  power  of 
the  party  organization,  which  may  aid  in  the  election  of  infer- 
ior candidates.  It  was  expected  that  the  voter's  privilege  of 
"plumping"  would  tend  to  defeat  undesirable  men,  but  in  fact 
this  has  at  times  worked  out  in  exactly  the  opposite  way.  Prac- 
tice here  illustrates  how  easily  a  reform  may  be  utilized  ad- 
vantageously by  the  very  people  against  whom  the  measure  was 
aimed  and  the  "triple  armed  voter  —  the  terror  of  party  des- 
potism" seems  to  have  been  reduced  to  a  very  harmless  terror 
indeed.  As  already  mentioned  the  party  organization  may  ex- 
ert all  its  influence  to  elect  its  candidate,  while  a  more  indepen- 
dent nominee  may  unwittingly  aid  his  own  defeat  by  asking  his 
party  to  divide  the  vote  equally  between  himself  and  his  ticket- 
mate.  While  such  cases  may  happen  their  frequency  has  un- 
doubtedly been  exaggerated.  Election  statistics  show  but  com- 
paritively  few  instances  where  a  candidate  has  been  defeated  by 
"plumping."  Even  assuming,  what  facts  will  not  warrant, 
namely,  that  all  nominees  who  fail  of  election  are  the  very  ones 


66  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINOKITY  REPRESENTATION        [208 

that  should  haAre  been  elected,  few  men  have  been  kept  out  of 
the  legislature  on  this  account,  who,  for  the  good  of  the  com- 
munity, should  have  been  there. 

Another  circumstance  which  may  affect  the  personnel  of  the 
legislature  is  incidental  rather  than  essential  to  minority  repre- 
sentation. In  this  state,  if  three  legislators  are  to  be  elected 
from  a  district,  the  number  of  these  latter  must  be  somewhat 
limited  and  this  necessitates  the  union  of  two  or  more  counties. 
This  combination  leads  to  jealousies  between  the  counties, 
each  fearing  that  it  will  not  get  its  full  share  of  the  spoils.  When 
fights  of  this  sort  occur  the  personality  and  qualifications  of 
the  candidates  are  lost  sight  of  and  the  only  question  considered 
by  the  voter  is  whether  or  not  the  nominee  is  a  "home"  man. 
While  these  county  feuds  exist  and  are  sometimes  of  long  stand- 
ing, it  is  doubtful  if  they  produce  much  effect  on  the  personnel 
of  the  legislature.  Some  desirable  candidates  have  probably 
been  defeated  because  of  county  jealousies,  but  it  is  probably 
true  that  just  as  many  undesirable  nominees  have  failed  of  elec- 
tion for  the  same  reason  and  the  account  is  about  balanced. 

Many  of  those  expressing  their  opinion  on  the  subject  believe 
that  the  method  of  election  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  character 
and  ability  of  the  legislators  and  this  seems  the  reasonable  and 
logical  view.  The  voters  and  character  of  the  voters  will  be  the 
same  regardless  of  the  method  of  election  and,  generally  speak- 
ing, elected  officials  are  representative  of  those  from  whom  they 
receive  their  credentials. 

While  the  cumulative  vote  requires  strict  party  discipline,  the 
abuse  of  that  discipline  does  not  necessarily  follow, '  but  it  is 
evident  that  when  the  innovation  was  introduced  into  Illinois 
it  was  not  properly  safeguarded.  While  few  attempts  have  been 
made  to  abolish  the  cumulative  vote  by  constitutional  amend- 
ment several  schemes  have  been  proposed  to  free  it  of  its  atten- 
dant evils.  A  reform  which  has  been  suggested  and  championed 
by  at  least  one  rather  prominent  civic  organization  is  to  compel 
each  party  to  nominate  a  full  ticket  of  three  candidates.  The 
object  is,  of  course,  to  present  a  considerable  number  of  men 
from  which  the  voter  may  select  those  he  considers  best  quali- 
fied but  the  attempt  to  inaugurate  this  change  without  specific 
statutory  authority  failed.  This  method  would  obviously  be  a 
plain  violation  of  the  spirit,  if  not  of  the  letter,  of  the  constitu- 


209]      DIFFICULTIES  AND  EFFECT  ON  LEGISLATIVE  PERSONNEL  67 

tion  if  such  a  law  or  custom  were  followed  in  good  faith.  For 
illustration,  we  will  assume  a  district  in  which  the  Republican 
party  has  a  majority.  This  party  would  nominate  a  full  ticket 
and  the  Democratic  and  other  minority  parties  would  do  like- 
wise. Since  party  dis-affection  is  the  unusual  rather  than  us- 
ual condition,  the  result  would  be  ordinarily  that  each  voter 
would  cast  one  vote  for  each  candidate  of  his  party,  and  the  three 
Republican  nominees  would  be  elected  and  minority  representa- 
tion practically  abolished.  Such  practice  would  give  the  inde- 
pendent voters  a  chance  to  exercise  their  discretion,  but  it  is 
only  when  the  occasional  wave  of  civic  virtue  sweeps  over  the 
country  that  they  become  numerous  enough  to  endanger  party 
success.  The  usual  results  of  each  party  having  a  ticket  of  three 
candidates  would  be  that  the  majority  party  would  elect  all 
three  representatives  at  the  expense  of  the  minority. 

If  three  men  were  nominated  in  good  faith  by  each  party, 
thus  putting  a  larger  number  of  candidates  in  the  field,  of  which 
only  three  could  be  elected,  the  result  would  be  a  hard,  bitter 
fight,  not  between  parties,  but  between  nominees  on  the  same 
ticket.  It  would  be  easier  for  a  Republican,  for  example,  to 
secure  one  or  one  and  one-half  votes  from  his  colleague  than  it 
would  to  cross  party  lines  and  secure  the  same  from  his  Demo- 
cratic opponent.  Parties  would  be  demoralized,  cliques  and  rings 
would  grow  up  around  certain  individuals  and  campaigns  would 
be  waged  not  on  political  issues  but  personalities.  Such  a 
change  would  in  no  way  affect  the  real  evil  in  the  case. 

In  the  above  it  is  assumed  that  in  nominating  three  candidates 
each  party  acts  in  good  faith.  Every  conclusion,  however,  that 
can  be  drawn  from  past  history  or  present  conditions  indicates 
that  such  practice  would  not  be  conscientiously  carried  out  by 
any  party  nor  is  it  probable  that  any  legislation  could  accomp- 
lish the  desired  result.  Taking  the  example  previously  given, 
if  the  Democrats  only  had  enough  votes  to  elect  one  man  if  they 
"plumped"  on  him,  they  undoubtedly  would  "plump."  Three 
names  might  appear  on  the  ticket,  but  it  would  be  made  known 
that  two  of  them  were  there  to  meet  the  technical  requirements 
and  that  there  was  but  one  real  candidate.  A  rebellious  voter 
might  not  vete  for  that  one,  but  if  he  did  not  he  would  be  prac- 
tically sure  that  he  was  wasting  his  vote. 


CHAPTER  VII 
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION 

In  the  preceding  discussion  it  has  been  shown  that  the  cumu- 
lative method  in  practically  all  cases  secures  minority  represen- 
tation in  the  legislative  districts  of  the  state.  Considering  only 
the  two  main  parties,  representation  is  obtained  very  nearly 
proportional  to  the  vote  cast  by  each.  Parties  other  than  the 
Republican  and  Democratic  seldom  have  more  votes  in  any  dis- 
trict than  the  weaker  of  these  two  main  ones  and  hence  elect  but 
few  members.  There  is,  however,  a  much  smaller  waste  of  votes 
and  smaller  percentage  of  non-representation  than  prevails 
under  the  ordinary  majority  system. 

The  evils  of  gerrymandering  are  greatly  reduced,  as  is  in- 
dicated by  the  fact  that  the  vote  required  to  elect  a  representa- 
tive is  about  the  same  for  either  of  the  two  principal  parties, 
while  for  senators,  elected  by  the  plurality  system  from  the  same 
districts,  it  requires  from  two  to  four  times  as  many  Democratic 
as  Republican  votes  to  elect  one  member. 

The  minority  party  does  occasionally  secure  undue  representa- 
tion, as  in  some  instances  it  has  elected  two  out  of  three  repre- 
sentatives. Such  results,  however,  occur  only  in  a  few  cases 
since  only  in  about  four  per  cent  of  the  total  elections  has  a 
minority  elected  an  excessive  member  of  legislators  from  indi- 
vidual districts.  These  mishaps  may  be  due  to  bad  management 
by  the  majority  party  failing  to  nominate  the  candidates  which 
it  might  elect  or  one  party  nominating  three  candidates  when  it 
had  not  sufficient  votes  to  elect  them ;  or  by  one  or  more  of  the 
opposition  parties  concentrating  on  one  candidate ;  or  they  may 
be  caused  by  the  personal  popularity  of  a  candidate ;  by  county 
feuds,  where  two  or  more  are  joined  in  one  district ;  or  by  the 
party  organization  fighting  valiantly  for  a  candidate  whom  it 
fears  may  be  defeated. 

In  every  case  where  a  party  has  had  a  plurality  in  the  state 
it  has  had  a  plurality  in  the  lower  house  of  the  legislature,  and 

68 


211]  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION  69 

the  will  of  the  people,  as  indicated  by  party  vote,  has  never  been 
defeated  because  of  occasional  instances  of  the  minority  securing 
excessive  representation  in  certain  districts. 

Any  system  like  the  cumulative  method  has  inherent  qualities 
which  demand  strict  party  discipline.  Political  leaders  of  the 
state  have  not  been  slow  to  take  advantage  of  this.  The  most 
noticeable  and  pernicious  evil,  before  the  enactment  of  the  pri- 
mary law,  was  the  rigorous  limitation  of  nominees  presented  by 
the  two  principal  parties  at  each  election.  While  this  condi- 
tion has  not  been  greatly  changed  since  the  use  of  the  primary 
system,  the  people  do  have  a  wider  choice,  as  indicated  by 
the  large  number  of  candidates  at  the  primaries  from  which  to 
select  the  limited  number  of  nominees,  and  as  also  indicated  by 
the  increase  of  four  nominee  districts.  Although  party  control 
is  required  by  the  cumulative  vote,  it  is  doubtful  if,  on  the  whole, 
political  bossism  has  been  worse  in  Illinois  than  in  other  states. 
In  Illinois,  however,  with  the  system  unguarded  as  it  was  until 
quite  recently,  it  was  very  difficult  for  the  electorate  to  free 
itself  from  this  undesirable  party  domination  even  if  so  inclined. 
If  a  satisfactory  primary  law,  allowing  the  electors  a  wide  choice 
in  their  selection  of  nominees,  is  available,  the  Illinois  voter 
would  seem  as  free  to  rid  himself  of  undue  partisan  control  as 
the  voter  in  other  states  where  the  cumulative  system  does  not 
prevail. 

The  practical  difficulties  of  voting  under  the  cumulative  sys- 
tem as  used  in  this  state  are  so  slight  as  to  constitute  no  real 
objection. 

The  effect  of  the  cumulative  method  on  the  personnel  of  the 
legislature  is  difficult  to  ascertain  definitely,  since  the  character 
of  legislators  who  might  have  bean  elected  to  office  under  some 
other  plan  of  selection  is  entirely  indeterminate.  The  logical 
conclusion,  however,  drawn  from  comparison,  is  that  the  cumula- 
tive method  has  had  little  effect  on  the  personnel  of  the  Assemb- 
ly. The  method  of  voting  can,  of  course,  have  no  influence  on 
the  electorate  which  determines  who  the  representatives  shall  be. 
In  comparison  with  other  states  the  members  of  the  Illinois  legis- 
lature seem  to  be  a  fair  average,  thus  again  indicating  the  small 
effects  which  electoral  methods  have  on  the  character  of  officials. 

The  strongest  recommendation  for  the  cumulative  system  is 


70  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  MINORITY  REPRESENTATION        [212 

the  fact  that  at  all  times  it  secures  representation  for  a  minor- 
ity party,  thus  insuring  a  strong  minority  in  the  lower  house 
of  the  General  Assembly.  The  inherent  justice  of  the  first  men- 
tioned fact  will  appeal  strongly  to  civic  reformers  and  is  worthy 
of  consideration  when  discussing  the  merits  of  minority  rep- 
resentations, wThile  the  latter  makes  impossible  the  tyranny 
of  an  overwhelming  majority  which  is  too  often  inclined  to  over- 
ride the  minority  in  a  mere  wanton  display  of  power.  An  ever 
present  minority  also  serves  to  check  the  tendency  towards  cor- 
ruption which  almost  invariably  follows  when  one  party  has  for  a 
considerable  time  a  large  majority  in  the  legislature.  This  ap- 
plies with  special  force  to  Illinois  where  with  but  few  exceptions 
one  party  has  had  control  of  the  state  for  many  years. 

The  serious  objection  to  the  cumulative  method  is  the  oppor- 
tunity it  affords  for  ''machine"  control  and  party  "bossism." 
While  the  primary  system  in  itself  is  not  a  guarantee  against 
undesirable  party  activity  yet  in  practice  it  has  in  other  states 
bettered  political  conditions  and  there  is  no  apparent  reason 
why  a  satisfactory  primary  law  may  not  accomplish  the  same  re- 
sult in  Illinois  if  the  voters  will  avail  themselves  freely  of  its 
opportunities. 

It  may  also  be  said  of  the  primary  that  it  in  no  way  affects 
the  cumulative  system  of  voting.  It  simply  applies  the  system 
in  two  elections  instead  of  one.  Minority  representation  is  also 
unaffected  as  evidenced  by  Table  II.  With  a  satisfactory  pri- 
mary system  in  force  the  people  may,  if  they  will,  apparently 
control  their  legislature  as  effectively  as  under  the  ordinary  plur- 
ality system  and  in  addition  secure  an  approach  to  proportional 
representation  so  far  as  the  two  major  parties  are  concerned. 


EEFEBENCES 

Humphreys,  John  H.  Proportional  Representation.  London,  1911.  An 
excellent  discussion  of  proportional  representation. 

Commons,  John  R.     Proportional  Representation.     New  York,  1907. 

Hoag,  C.  C.  Effective  Voting.  Senate  D.  C.  No.  359,  53rd  Gong.,  2nd 
Sess.  (1914).  A  brief  statement  regarding  the  system  of  proportional 
representation. 

Jones,  Walter  Clyde.  The  Direct  Primary  in  Illinois.  Proceedings, 
American  Political  Science  Association,  1910.  A  statement  of  the  ex- 
perience of  Illinois  in  enacting  a  primary  law. 

Massachusetts,  Constitutional  Convention,  1917.  Bulletins  Nos.  27  and  28 
(Preferential  voting  and  proportional  representation). 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS-URBANA 

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THE  HISTORY  OF  CUMULATIVE  VOTING  AND  WIN 


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